

STABILITY CHANGE IN AFRICA

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STABILITY AND CHANGE IN AFRICA

MR. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

This is my first visit to the University of Toronto but it is very far from being my first contact with it. People from this University have worked at our University College in Dar es Salaam and in many different sectors of our Government; they have made great contributions to our progress. We have many old and valued friends here: people to whom we are indebted for good service gladly rendered.

Let me begin, therefore, by expressing to this University our appreciation for the co-operation and assistance we have received. You have released good people to work with us, and not just sent the people you could most gladly spare! Let me also say "thank you" to the individuals concerned. They have helped us to implement our policies; they have helped us to see and to understand the problems we are faced with; when we have asked, they have suggested alternative solutions to these problems—though I must hasten to add that they bear no responsibility for our failures. The decision to accept or reject their suggestions is one we have always reserved to ourselves!

This kind of technical assistance is very valuable to us. It also has a by-product which is, I believe, important to Canada as well. For not only have we learned something about Canada from these workers. As intelligent people who have lived with us and worked with us, they have learned something about us. When they return to this country, they are therefore frequently able to spread an understanding of what we are trying to do. They can tell of our successes and our failures; more important, they can also put our actions into the context of our circumstances and our motives. I believe this to be important to both countries. For Tanzania's policy of self-reliance does not imply that we dream of isolating ourselves. We recognize that we are involved in the world and that the world is involved in us.

Involvement without understanding, however, can be embarrassing and even dangerous. And while the involvement is inevitable, a lack of understanding about Africa is only too easy. Our very existence as nations is exotic. And now our voices on the international scene are strident; we complain about things which others take for granted; we make demands on other nations of the world, which appear unreasonable to more traditional habits of thought. The reaction is natural. Our actions and our demands are looked upon with all the suspicion which is normally directed

towards upstarts. And everything we do is judged in the light of attitudes which grew out of the aftermath of the second world war. In other words, every possible attempt is made to squeeze African events into the framework of the cold war or other big power conflicts.

The big question is always: "Is this or that African country pro-East or pro-West?"

These kinds of question are understandable because of the recent history of Europe and America. But they are the wrong questions for anyone who wishes to understand what is happening in Africa. They are based on a very fundamental mistake—and, I would add, an unwarranted degree of arrogance! They imply that Africa has no ideas of its own and no interests of its own. They assume the exclusive validity of the international conflicts which existed when we achieved nationhood. They are based on the belief that African actions must inevitably be determined by reference to either the Western liberal tradition or to communist theory or practice.

In fact, I hope that Africa has learned, and will continue to learn, from total human experience—from peoples in the West, East, North and South, whether we use these compass points as political or geographical terms! But what we are, in fact, trying to do is to solve the problems of Africa—and in our case, of Tanzania—as we experience them. And we are making this attempt as Africans and as Tanzanians; as people who have been shaped by a history which goes back further than the century or so of colonialism. Further, we look at the world as people who believe that they have something to contribute to mankind, as well as something to gain from it.

Our need for both change and stability.

Yet we are new nations. Like every other people in the world we have always had a desire to be our own masters. We lost our freedom through defeat by the technically superior forces of Europe. Our first concern was to regain it, and our first priority now is to guard that freedom and to make it a reality.

When we did regain our freedom, however, we gained control over a different structure. In Tanzania it was more than one hundred tribal units which lost their freedom; it was one nation which regained it. By the forces of history we have been brought politically into this twentieth century world; our new freedom can only be maintained if we adopt other aspects of twentieth century life as well.

Another fundamental change makes other demands upon the national government which were not made on the traditional tribal governments. The Tanzanian people now know that our poverty, our ignorance, and our diseases, are not an inevitable part of the

human condition. Once we accepted these things as the will of God; now they are recognized as being within the control of man. Political freedom is therefore no longer enough for us.

We in Tanzania are thus conscious of two over-whelming needs. We are determined to maintain our mastery over our own destiny—to defend our national freedom. We are also determined to change the condition of our lives. It is to meet these two needs that we must have both change and stability. Somehow these two must be combined, because in the circumstances of Tanzania, and indeed of Africa, neither is possible without the other.

Change to make freedom a reality.

For although political and social stability is necessary to any real national or personal freedom, so too is change in our circumstances. At present our national freedom often exists on paper only, for our country is so poor, and so weak relative to other nations, that we do not play our rightful part in the human community. Decisions on matters which vitally concern us can be—and often are—made without any reference to us. And this is understandable. Even defending our national integrity against the intervention of foreign powers strains us to the utmost. A very great change in our economic well-being is necessary before we can meet these responsibilities of national freedom.

Nor is it only in national terms that real freedom is undermined by our poverty. What freedom has our subsistence farmer? He scratches a bare living from the soil provided the rains do not fail; his children work at his side without schooling, medical care, or even good feeding. Certainly he has freedom to vote and to speak as he wishes. But these freedoms are much less real to him than his freedom to be exploited. Only as his poverty is reduced will his existing political freedom become properly meaningful and his right to human dignity become a fact of human dignity.

This essential economic change will not, and cannot, take place in isolation. It depends upon, and it brings, social and political change. It is not even possible simply to expand the social and political organization which was introduced into the country by the colonial power. These were based on an individualistic philosophy which is contrary to both our traditions and our aspirations for human equality. And they were directed at the problems of imposing and maintaining an alien law and order, not at securing mobilization for the improvement in living conditions which our people now demand.

The need for stability.

Yet stable government, and stability in the society, is also essential to our freedom. For without political stability African countries will remain the playthings of others. Without it, alien forces can influence

our policies for their own benefit, and outside powers can wage their wars on our territories and with our peoples. It is perfectly true that many of us in Africa are in danger of getting a phobia about foreign plots, and of attributing to foreign machinations all the evils we suffer from. But although the original failures may be ours, no intelligent and knowledgeable person would deny that outside forces do take advantage of African division for their own benefit, or that they exacerbate our conflicts when this suits their purpose.

Quite apart from the defence of our national integrity, however, stability is also essential for economic development. We cannot increase agricultural production, organize markets for home-produced goods, meet export orders, or arrange for the supply of essential investment goods, unless there is stability and security in the country. An effective administration, secure communications, and personal safety, are prerequisites for any attack on the poverty which now oppresses us.

In brief, change causes disturbance and thus upsets stability, but positive change is impossible without stability. And stability is itself impossible in Africa without change. Africa's task is therefore to achieve a difficult balance between the conflicting and complementary needs for change and stability.

Tanzania's internal policies.

Tanzania is attempting to achieve change by deliberate policy, and to maintain stability by involving all the people in both the direction and the process of change. We are under no illusions about the difficulty of the task we have undertaken. With few socialists we are trying to build socialism; with few people conscious of the basic requirements of democracy we are trying to achieve change by democratic means; with few technicians we are trying to effect a fundamental transformation of our economy. And with an educational elite whose whole teaching encouraged motives of individualistic advancement, we are trying to create an egalitarian society!

It is not my intention to speak about these internal policies today. I will only say that so far we have retained our balance. But I am optimistic about our future, provided that factors outside our control do not prevent us from continuing with our efforts.

Change and stability in Southern Africa.

For Tanzania is one small part of Africa, and our future is linked with that of the continent as a whole. Even if we wished, we could not be unaffected by what happens on this land mass. But in fact none of us in Africa has learned to think in exclusively

nationalistic terms—we still think of ourselves as Africans. It is, of course, true that there are some conflicts between African states and within African states. Yet these are like the conflicts between the Provinces of Canada—important provided there is no overwhelming external challenge to the principles on which the existence of each state is based. Our part of Africa feels itself to be involved with all other parts. We are learning—indeed I think we have learned—that the people from one free state have no right or duty to intervene in the affairs of another free state. We recognize that each nation has to deal with the conflicting needs of stability and change in its own way. If we think other free peoples are wrong, or if they fail in their endeavours, we still have no choice but to adapt ourselves to deal with the problems that their policies create for us.

But the situation is very different in relation to Southern Africa and to the remaining Portuguese colonies in Africa. In Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea, the African peoples are being governed by an external power which categorically rejects the principle of self-determination. In Southern Rhodesia the colonial power claims to accept the principle of self-determination, but has utterly failed to assert its authority against a racist minority which denies this principle. In South Africa the apartheid policy is imposed on the Africans and other non-white peoples, and maintained by the most ruthless suppression. And the United Nations has failed to take any effective steps to dislodge this same tyranny from South-West Africa. In all these cases, outside forces are suppressing Africans, and Africans are being humiliated and persecuted simply for being what they are—black or coloured Africans.

In relation to all these areas of our continent, therefore, Africa as a whole recognizes a challenge from external forces and from a racialism which denies our rights as human beings. We cannot be uninvolved. Just one African state does not have a recent experience of colonialism—and for many years that was independent in name only. We have all suffered from some degree of racial discrimination. If we accept the continuation of such conditions in Southern Africa, we are denying our own moral right to freedom and human equality, and are forced to justify our existence on the grounds of an economic and military strength which we do not, in fact, possess. We cannot adopt this attitude.

But in any case, whatever the emotions may be, the fact is that Tanzania's freedom is itself in jeopardy while colonialism and racialism remain dominant on our borders. As long as we insist on making a reality of our freedom, and pursuing policies which uphold the dignity of African people, our existence is a threat to the colonialist and racist states of Southern Africa. They would inevitably take

steps to reduce the effectiveness of our policies and to control our actions. For just as their policy of racialism makes it daily more difficult for us to build a state on the basis of non-racialism, so they cannot secure their slave systems while the rest of Africa uses its freedom for the benefit of its people. The principles of freedom and equality have no validity unless they are of universal validity; and the principle of racial supremacy is invalid unless it is universally valid. Conflict between these two conceptions of humanity is inevitable. Where they meet, the conflict will become an active one.

Tanzania's concern with the situation in Southern Africa is thus not something which is extraneous to our other policies. It is a matter affecting our security. It is central to everything we try to do. It is not that we are great altruists who love freedom so much that they will fight for it everywhere and anywhere. We know our limitations. We also know that people can only free themselves—no-one else can prevent them from trying to win their freedom, and no-one else can do it for them. But in the case of Southern Africa, we and the other free states are all involved. We are all Africans; we all need to work together for the real development of any of us; and a continuing freedom struggle in one part of the continent affects the security of all other parts. This involvement is acutely realized in Tanzania because we are a border state between free Africa and colonial Africa; but the same considerations apply to a greater or lesser extent to all free African states. Very little can be understood about Africa until this is understood.

Let me therefore try to sum up our position on this matter. The common objective of the African people is self-determination for the peoples of Southern Africa and the other Portuguese colonies, and an end to the official propagation and practice of racialism in our continent. That is all. We are not anti-white terrorists wishing to impose a reverse racialism; we wish to uphold human equality and to give human dignity and non-racialism a chance to grow in our lands.

As far as the free states of Africa are concerned, what comes after freedom is an affair of the peoples of those territories. It is not for us to decide what sort of government they will have or what sort of system they will adopt. Tanzania must support the struggle for freedom in these areas regardless of the political philosophy of those who are conducting the struggle. If they are capitalists, we must support them; if they are liberals, we must support them; if they are communists, we must support them; if they are socialists, we must support them. We support them as nationalists. Our own commitment to socialism in Tanzania is irrelevant to the right of the people of Mozambique (and the other areas) to choose their own government and their own political system. The right of a people to freedom from alien domination comes before socialism. The right of a man to stand upright as a human being in his own

country comes before questions of the kind of society he will create once he has that right. Freedom is the only thing that matters until it is won. The support which is given to the freedom struggles by Tanzania and by other African states is neither a disguised form of new imperialism nor an evangelical mission for socialism or capitalism. It is a recognition of the oneness of Africa.

By peace or violence?

Yet there remains a big question. Is the freedom struggle to be waged by peaceful methods or by violence? Is Africa to support the freedom movement regardless of the methods used, or could we make our support conditional?

There are some people who appear to believe that there is virtue in violence and that only if a freedom struggle is conducted by war and bloodshed can it lead to real liberation. I am not one of these people; the Government of Tanzania does not accept this doctrine, and nor do any of the other free African Governments as far as I am aware. We know that war causes immense sufferings, that it is usually the most innocent who are the chief victims, and that the hatred and fear generated by war are dangerous to the very freedom and non-racialism it is our purpose to support. We have a deep desire for a peaceful transfer of power to the people. We believe that if a door is shut, attempts should be made to open it; if it is ajar, it should be pushed until it is open wide. In neither case should the door be blown up at the expense of those inside.

But if the door to freedom is locked and bolted, and the present guardians of the door have refused to turn the key or pull the bolts, the choice is very straightforward. Either you accept the lack of freedom or you break the door down.

That, unfortunately, is the present position in Southern Africa and, unless there is some new outside influence which forces a reversal of policy on those now in power, that is the choice now before us.

Portugal has proclaimed that its colonies in Africa are part of the metropolitan country and that self-determination for the peoples of these territories is therefore not a matter for discussion. Political organization is prohibited, all attempts at peaceful protest are suppressed, and change by negotiation is ruled out. In Rhodesia, the people's organizations have been banned and the leaders imprisoned. Even the British Government's absurd suggestion that the white minority should promise to bring discrimination to an end gradually has been answered by a clear statement of determination to maintain perpetual white supremacy. To the South African Government, discrimination on racial grounds is a basic article of faith which admits no argument.

In all these areas the demand for freedom has been rejected in principle. The door to progress is shut, bolted and barred.

In such a situation the only way the people can get freedom is by force. A peaceful end to oppression is impossible. The only choice before the people is organized or unorganized violence. But chaos will result, not freedom, from spontaneous uprisings when the frustrations get too great to be borne, or when some fresh turn of the screw goads the people to madness. Indeed, spontaneous uprisings in a modern and ruthless state are little more than mass suicide; they only achieve the release of death for many, and increased suffering for the others. When every avenue of peaceful change is blocked, then the only way forward to positive change is by channelling and directing the people's fury—that is, by organized violence, by a people's war against their government.

When this happens, Tanzania cannot deny support, for to do so would be to deny the validity of African freedom and African dignity. We are naturally and inevitably allies of the freedom fighters. We may decide, as we have decided, that no Tanzanian will take part in these wars; we may recognize the fact that we cannot arm the freedom fighters. But we cannot call for freedom in Southern Africa, and at the same time deny all assistance to those who are fighting for it, when we know, as well as they do, that every other means of achieving freedom has been excluded by those now in power.

The involvement of the West.

But it is not only African states which are inevitably involved in this conflict. All the traditional friends and allies of the powers concerned are also involved. Portugal is a member of N.A.T.O. To say the very least—much less than we believe to be the case!—the resulting military support allows Portugal to devote a greater proportion of her men and resources to the occupation of her African colonies than would otherwise be the case. Further, Portugal is a member of E.F.T.A.; it derives great benefit from selling to its Western allies goods which originate in the African colonies. Such economic links are another factor in the ability of the poorest state in Europe to spend something like 47 per cent of its Budget on "overseas defence"—which really means on the maintenance of colonialism in Africa.

About South Africa's position, I am sure it is unnecessary for me to say very much. It has great wealth and economic strength derived in part from past foreign investment. Its continuing economic development also owes much to new investment and re-investment by Western firms, and its international trade links with the West are very important to both sides. Indeed, the size of the Western involvement in South Africa's economy can be gauged by the indignation with which African demands for an economic boycott are met.

The illegality of the Southern Rhodesian regime has led to an economic boycott being imposed on that country. Nonetheless, the refusal of the colonial power either to make the boycott a total and effective one, or to enforce its decisions by direct intervention, has a reason. It reflects a sense of involvement with that administration and the people it represents—in other words, the dominant minority.

But my real point is not the fact of the West's economic involvement with Southern Africa. My concern is with their ideological involvement. I am not accusing the Western powers of conscious racialism, but of a preoccupation with conflicts which are at present irrelevant to the situation in Africa.

N.A.T.O. is a Western military alliance against East European communism—perhaps against communism itself—and Portugal is a member of N.A.T.O. South Africa claims to be a bastion against communism in Africa. The regime in Rhodesia claims that it is defending its part of Africa against communist-inspired chaos. These states are all anxious that their struggle against the freedom movements should be interpreted in the West as part of a world-wide anti-communist struggle. The real danger which worries me is that the West will accept this interpretation, and that it will, in consequence, betray its own principles by supporting these Southern African regimes.

The principle of self-determination and of national freedom is part of the democratic ideal; it is enshrined in all the greatest philosophies and documents of the Western world. But will the West recognize that this is the question at issue in Southern Africa, or will it be confused by this talk of "Western civilization" fighting "Eastern communism"?

If the struggle in Southern Africa is seen as the freedom struggle which it in fact is, the policies of Western states—both governments and peoples—will be determined only by the degree of their willingness to sacrifice immediate economic interests to political principles. But if the West accepts the South African and Portuguese argument that they are fighting on behalf of the "free world" against communism, than I believe that in time this interpretation will become defensible—at least as regards their enemies. For if the West supports these racist and fascist states, the freedom struggle will in reality become a part of the world ideological conflict—as it is now wrongly alleged to be. Further, I believe that if this is allowed to happen, we are liable to finish up with an even more disastrous conflict—a conflict of the races. For Africa and the West will be on opposite sides of the barricades; and Africa will have the support of Asia and large parts of Latin America.

Let me explain my fears and what I believe can be done by countries of the Western bloc to avoid such catastrophes.

Pressure for peaceful change.

Africa is anxious for peace in Southern Africa. But the possibility of this depends upon the possibility of ending the present injustice without war. Neither free Africa nor the Western world has the right to ask the peoples of Southern Africa to accept indefinitely the present humiliation, oppression and foreign domination; and in any case they would not pay heed to any such demands. The only chance for peace in Southern Africa is if change can be secured without violence. If this is possible, no-one will be happier than the people of Africa. But we have tried peaceful methods and we have failed. The people of Southern Africa are therefore resorting to war, and the free African states are supporting them. The only chance for peace now is if the allies of the Southern African states are willing and able to exert the kind of pressure which brings change with the minimum of violence.

Do the Western powers have the ability to exert such pressure? I believe that they have a great deal of power if they are willing to use it for this purpose. Both South Africa and Portugal gain great benefit from their association with the Western nations; they will not wish to lose that benefit.

It is possible that South Africa would refuse to make any concessions to the democratic sensibilities of its allies, even at the cost of complete international isolation. I say this is possible because many people in South Africa believe in apartheid as a religion and will defend their faith until death. But there are other South Africans who rejoice in, and who support, the segregationist policies of that Government because of the material benefit and the position of privilege it gives them. I believe this is the majority. Such people give a support which is conditional to the extent that it is not based on fear; there is a limit to the degree of international isolation they would be willing to accept rather than accept an organized move towards individual human equality. At the very least, therefore, strong Western pressure on South Africa could introduce a new uncertainty and new insecurity among the dominant group. The police state machine would thus lose the virtually total white support which it at present enjoys. In that case, the violence may not be of such long duration or of such bitterness.

But whatever the situation in South Africa, it is quite certain that Portugal could not withstand real pressures for change exerted by its N.A.T.O. allies. A nation can withstand pressures from outside when it is united in hostility to that pressure. But a poor nation cannot maintain its domination over territories twenty times its own size, and over populations 50 per cent greater than its own unless it has the support of more powerful countries. In relation to the Portuguese colonies at least, members of the Western alliance

do have the power to secure peace in Africa. They have the power to make a continuation of their support conditional upon Portugal's accepting the principle of self-determination.

Thus, in one case certainly, and in the other case possibly, it is the West which makes the choice between peace and war in Southern Africa. The question is not whether the Western powers are able to exert pressure on Portugal and on South Africa, but whether they are willing to do so. It is the implications of that question which I hope the people of this and other countries will carefully consider.

For I must stress that the choice before the free states of the world—which includes both Canada and Tanzania—is not between peaceful change and no change. The choice is between peaceful change and conflict. In the absence of peaceful change and real prospects of it continuing, the African people will fight for their rights. They will destroy stability rather than suffer under the stability of oppression. They have already begun to do so. We are not at the eleventh hour; we are past the twelfth. Already peace has to be re-established and confidence regained—both of which are harder things to do than to prevent war or to retain trust. So what is the alternative to a change in Southern Africa which is combined with stability?

The implications of war.

Portugal, South Africa and the regime in Southern Rhodesia are all heavily armed with modern weapons and they have access to more weapons. They even manufacture some. If the freedom fighters are to succeed in war, they too must have arms. Not even the most skilled guerrilla movement can fight machine guns with bows and arrows, or dig elephant traps across surfaced roads. Africa cannot supply these arms; we do not make them, and we have no money to buy them.

But if the Western powers will not put pressure on their friends to secure peaceful change, is it likely that they will supply arms to those who in desperation have decided to get change by force? We all know the answer. The freedom movements will therefore get their arms from the communist powers. And these communist powers will be their exclusive suppliers.

In these circumstances it is no use anyone telling the freedom fighters—or telling the free states of Africa—about the evils of communism, or about the possibility that the supplying states may present a bill for their support. We all know of that possibility; we do not imagine that communism makes great powers less subject to the temptations of greatness. But we are much less concerned about possible future dangers—which may never develop—than

we are with present facts. And those facts are that Africa is occupied by an alien power now; its people are suffering under minority domination now. We have to fight these things. So, we accept arms from communist states, and say "thank you" for them.

On the same basis, the nationalists of Southern Africa get their training where they can and from whom they can. Sometimes free African states can help in this; sometimes they cannot. And when they cannot, it is again communist countries which offer to help, and again we accept with gratitude.

We know our own motives in these actions. We are not communists; we are nationalists desiring freedom. We recognize the possibility that those who are helping us may have different motives. That is what we are told and we have no proof that it is not so. But we do have proof of our existing need and of practical offers to help.

So the freedom fighters use communist arms and are trained in communist countries because they have no choice. This is happening now and it will continue. And then South Africa and Portugal will proclaim to their allies this 'proof' that they are fighting communism. They will show captured communist weapons and display some hapless prisoner-of-war (whom they will call a criminal) in order to persuade those opposed to communism to support their war against the freedom fighters. They will also show evidence of cruelties, and tell tales of fear and suffering experienced by non-combatants on their side. And they will argue that this is the kind of people their opponents are—communists and racialists. Some of this evidence will be forged, but some will be true. Wars are always ugly and brutal, and guerrilla warfare is no exception.

In the face of this kind of psychological pressure, I am afraid that Western states would strengthen their support for the Southern African regimes. They would argue that for their own protection it was necessary to prevent Africa from falling into the hands of communists. They will therefore strengthen their economic support, and then agree to sell arms—or to give them—to the regimes of Southern Africa. Even the democratic and liberal people of the Western states will lose sympathy for the freedom movements, because they will come to believe that these have been captured by the communists. And gradually this conflict will become the ideological conflict which at present it is not.

At that point, because Africa does not look at things through cold war spectacles, the nature of the conflict may change again: it may become a confrontation between the poor, coloured world and the rich, white world. Only support for the freedom fighters from the Russian and East European communists would be breaking the colour pattern, and perhaps saving the world from this disaster.

Indeed, it may be that the liberal humanitarians of Western Europe and North America may find themselves grateful to the white communists!

I am talking of what seems to me to be a terrifying series of events unless some effort is made to break the chain of logic in African and Western bloc relations. Of course, I have grossly simplified what would really happen; but we in Africa are not very sophisticated people, and indeed I do not believe the masses in any country are politically sophisticated. Therefore, I think that the pattern I have outlined is the way things might well look to us from our different sides. The people in the West would be seeing us as communists who wish them ill; we would be seeing them as supporters of racialism and of tyranny.

The inevitable can be avoided.

These possibilities are real. If they develop, the effect on Africa could be terrible, and Africa's freedom struggle will bring great trouble to the world instead of releasing new energies for human growth—which is what we would like to think will happen. Yet knowing all that, we cannot draw back. For these are dangers and, however inevitable they may appear in logic, they are possibilities only. Our oppression is real and present.

Yet I believe that the dangers I have outlined can still be avoided, or at least very greatly reduced, if the Western powers look at the Southern African question in its proper framework, and if they now take the necessary action to de-fuse the situation. I know that it is not easy for the Western states to put pressure on their allies; all developed states are reluctant to interfere in what they regard as the internal affairs of another developed state. I know too that international trade is of mutual benefit, and that—as far as the Western states are concerned—their partners' gain from this trade is incidental to their own. I know that the West has heavy investments in Southern Africa which they wish to protect. But I do not believe that these facts necessarily determine the issue, for I do not believe that the only thing which the West cares about is economics. I am neither a Marxist nor a Capitalist. I do not believe that every human value is, or need always be, sacrificed to economic interests. I believe that the basic philosophy of Western democracy has its own life and its own power, and that the people's concept of freedom can triumph over their materialism.

However, even if I did believe that economics was the only thing which mattered to the West, I would still ask myself whether short-term or long-term factors will determine the West's policies. For although South Africa may now be a bigger trading partner than all the rest of Africa put together—I do not know whether this is true for

Canada—this will not always be the case. The population of South Africa is about 18 million; that of the rest of Africa is in the region of 250 million. However great the difference in wealth, these stark figures have their own logic—especially as the rest of us develop and become better markets because we are richer.

Further, the value of investments depends on their productivity. They are no use if the cost of protecting them is more than the return they give. And investments in areas of inevitable and foreseeable instability are surely of less value than investments where instability is a present but passing danger. For Southern Africa is still fighting for the right to begin change. Except to the extent that the kind of change develops out of the nature of the struggle, the real problems of African development in these areas will remain to be settled when freedom is won.

Conclusion.

Mr. President, when you asked me to speak at this University, it may be that you were expecting me to speak about the internal affairs of Tanzania or about the relevance of our experiment in socialism for other countries—though you were too kind to express your wishes. But I have chosen to talk of change as an essential element in the stability which we need, and to emphasize this in relation to Southern Africa. I have done this for a very particular reason.

This is a Canadian University, and we in Tanzania have very great respect and admiration for the people of Canada. We believe that this country has both the opportunity and the willingness to try to build bridges in the world, and in particular to build a bridge across the chasm of colour. I therefore chose to discuss this question with you because I believe you will understand what I am trying to say, and will care about these matters.

I know, of course, that Canada has its own problems of cultural conflict, of peoples with different languages and different backgrounds living together. I know that within your own society you are now trying to work out new modes of co-operation, which allow a full expression of democracy without jeopardizing the special cultural interests of any minority. These are real problems for you; indeed your efforts in this matter are of world-wide interest. It would therefore not be surprising if such questions preoccupied the attention of the Canadian people. But the world is very small now. Canada's actions—or lack of them—in relation to Africa are also important to your future as well as to ours. For the questions are there; and the threat to peace is there. They will not go away because this large, wealthy and peace-loving state wishes to concentrate on

its internal problems. You cannot escape giving an answer to the challenge of the freedom movements in Africa—even if it is only an answer by default.

Let me make it quite clear that I am not promising peace, stability, democracy, humanity or an absence of oppression in Africa, provided Canada (either alone or with its allies) recognizes the freedom struggle in Southern Africa for what it is, and adopts attitudes in conformity with its own principles. Africa has too many problems for that kind of optimism. When national freedom exists all over Africa, and when racial minorities cease to dominate any part of our continent, we will still have daunting difficulties to face and few resources with which to tackle them. We may still fail to make good use of our opportunities; we may be as slow to develop real individual freedom from both economic and political oppression as the worst states in the world. But we are determined to gain the chance to try to deal with these problems. And we can only give top priority to these questions of developing individual freedom and individual dignity when the whole of Africa is free.

The questions remain. Will Canada at least understand that freedom means as much to us in Africa as it does to any other people? And, if Canada cannot support our struggle, will it at least be able to refrain from giving comfort and help to those who would deny freedom and dignity to us? For the sake of Tanzania and Africa most of all, but also for the sake of future relations between men of different colours and different creeds, I hope that Canadians will be able to give attention to these problems. I hope that Universities like this one will help the people of this country to consider all the implications of their choice.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: Thank you.



Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere. President of the United Republic of Tanzania
President of the Tanganyika African National Union.