

“The Honour of Africa”

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MWALIMU JULIUS K. NYERERE

**THE PRESIDENT, MWALIMU JULIUS K. NYERERE'S ADDRESS
TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**

Tuesday, 14th December, 1965

Mr. Speaker, Members of the National Assembly, Ladies and Gentlemen.

My purpose today is to explain the policies and attitudes of the Tanzanian Government one month after the illegal Declaration of Independence by the racist minority government in Southern Rhodesia.

The policies of Tanzania, and of Africa, in relation to Southern Rhodesia, have always had one object, and one object only. That was, and is, to secure a rapid transition to independence on the basis of majority rule. On this subject every action we have taken, every speech we have made, has been intended to further that purpose. We have no other.

The declared policy of the British Government—successive British Governments—in relation to all her colonies has been the same. Our past disagreements with Britain have been on the basis of her performance in particular places at particular times—not really on the basis of ideas. The basic friendship between our two countries, and between Africa and Britain, has been based on our belief that underlying any current disagreements was a present day, similar purpose, of bringing all colonial territories—including those dominated by white minorities—to democratic independence.

Why then is Africa now quarrelling with Britain to the extent that Africa has said if certain things are not done by the 15th December—tomorrow—we shall break diplomatic relations with that country? When the enemy is the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia, why are we breaking relations with Britain when she says that she also is an enemy of the Smith regime?

There is a very simple reason. In an ordered society, when a man is wronged by an illegal act he does not, and should not, take the law into his own hands. He applies to the law, and those responsible for enforcing the law, for redress. And he expects that action will be taken to relieve him of the wrongs which he is suffering because of an illegal action. It is by such procedure that peace and justice are maintained within states. It is by similar procedures that international peace and justice can be maintained between states. Nations which are wronged by the action or inaction of another nation call upon the nation responsible to relieve them of their wrong; or they call upon the United Nations for assistance against the country responsible.

If an individual who is suffering from a continuing illegal act finds that the organs of law and order fail to act in his defence, what is he supposed to do? Even more, if those organs which are meant to protect him appear to be helping the criminal instead, what must his reaction be? He will say—and he will be entitled to say—"This is enough; I will have nothing more to do with you unless and until you demonstrate to my satisfaction that you propose doing something effective against those who continue to wrong me."

That is the meaning and implication of the Resolution passed by the Organization of African Unity Foreign Ministers at Addis Ababa. Africa is saying to Britain, "This is enough".

Mr. Speaker, this is a very serious thing for one country to say to another. It is still more serious when 36 countries say it through an Organization for Unity which they have themselves established. The people of Africa, and indeed, the people of Britain themselves, are entitled to ask for an explanation. They need to understand the evidence which causes Africa to say to the British Government—"This is enough". Before Africans can support their leaders on such a serious matter they must be sure that Britain is the country responsible in law for the wrong to Africa, and the country which must therefore undertake to remove that wrong. They must be sure too, that any failure is a failure of intent and not merely an inefficiency of execution.

I believe these two charges against Britain must be made, and can be sustained, in relation to the events in Southern Rhodesia. I believe further that it is Africa's inescapable duty to make these charges, and to take action in accordance with the evidence.

Let me make the charges clear. Africa maintains that Southern Rhodesia is at present a colony of the United Kingdom, and that ultimate responsibility for events there resides, in consequence, with the Government of the United Kingdom in London. That Government may delegate its responsibility if it wishes, but it cannot escape it; if it entrusts its responsibility for the Government of Southern Rhodesia to other people, then it is responsible for their actions. If the British Government disagrees with what is being done by those to whom it has entrusted power, then it must replace those people. If those people assume powers which have not been entrusted to them, then the British Government must reassert its authority and get rid of those who have usurped its power.

The first charge is thus that Britain is the right place to go to for redress. The second charge is that Britain has not shown serious determination either to get rid of those in Southern Rhodesia who have usurped British power, or to replace them by representatives of the people. For it is not the independence of Rhodesia that Africa is complaining about; it is independence under a racialist minority government.

What is the evidence to support those charges?

Southern Rhodesia is a British colony; its constitution is subject to the will of the British Parliament. As an international entity Southern Rhodesia does not exist. Internationally, by both law and custom, there exists only Britain and its colony.

The colony of Southern Rhodesia has been self-governing since 1923; for 42 years increasing *de facto* power has been exerted by a Government based in Salisbury. But the constitution under which that Government operated reserved certain powers to the British Government and Parliament in London. The fact that successive British Governments did not use their powers to prevent acts which were contrary to the interests of the African people this fact does not alter the existence of these "Reserved Powers", nor the ultimate responsibility of the British Government for the actions of the Southern Rhodesian Government.

In saying this there is no need to argue abstract cases in law. Britain herself accepts responsibility for Southern Rhodesia. More, she claims that done about Southern Rhodesia. The only time she has ever used the veto in the United Nations was when Ghana proposed a Resolution which would have blocked the transfer to the Southern Rhodesian Government of the Air Force which had been built up by the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In the Commonwealth Conferences of 1964 and 1965, the Governments of Britain maintained this stand, and it was conceded by the rest of the Commonwealth—

including the African members. And only just over a week ago—on 6th December, 1965—Mr. Wilson, the Prime Minister of Britain, is reported to have said once again, "Rhodesia is Britain's responsibility".

There is thus no dispute between Britain and Africa about the British responsibility. What then of the manner in which that responsibility has been, and is being, exercised.

I do not propose to go back further than October 1964 in an examination of the British record. The record before that date is a shameful one; time after time the interests of the African majority were subjected to the selfish power hunger of the Settler Minority. Even after 1947, when other colonies in Africa began to feel some hope of attaining freedom, the settlers of Southern Rhodesia were able to extend their sway. In return for some concessions on the periphery of power, some verbal acceptance of the theory of "partnership" they were able to secure dominance in a Federation of Rhodesia with the countries which are now Zambia and Malawi. In 1961, with the tide running hard against them, and when they were concerned to try and save their Federation, they still managed to secure a constitution for Southern Rhodesia which entrenched minority power while only appearing to make some concessions to the African population. And in 1963, at the break-up of the Federation, they secured into their own hands the real instruments of power—the aeroplanes, the equipment, and the administration of the Army and the Air Force.

For the settler government of Southern Rhodesia even this was not enough. In 1963, and even more in 1964, they began to demand independence for themselves.

That was the position in October, 1964. It was an extremely difficult position for anyone to deal with. The effects of mistakes, errors, or sins, do not disappear because one regrets them; they create their own difficulties and reduce the area of possible movement. It is legitimate to sympathise with the problem facing anyone assuming responsibility for Southern Rhodesia in October, 1964. Africa did sympathise. Tanzania did sympathise. We sympathised the more because we felt that a new element had entered into the situation, and that there was hope that the long series of betrayals would end and be replaced by some attempt to implement the principles of human justice.

A good start was made. On 27th October, 1964, the Prime Minister of Britain said openly to Mr. Smith, the Prime Minister in a British colony, unilateral "declaration of independence would be an open act of defiance and rebellion, and it would be treasonable to take steps to give effect to it." These strong words meant that Africa was heartened despite the fact that the statement went on to speak only of the economic consequences of such a Declaration.

In November, however, the Smith Government called for a Referendum in support of independence for Southern Rhodesia under the 1961 constitution. He received 58,000 votes in support. I ask that this House should take particular note of that number; it is less than the total registered voters in the Dar es Salaam South constituency of Tanzania. And even that vote was only obtained after Mr. Smith had said that he was not asking for a vote in support of an illegal declaration of independence!

Threats of illegal action nonetheless continued to come from Salisbury, and apart from warnings about what would happen if they were carried out, nothing was done to those who made the threats. Indeed, by the end of the year there were indications from London that independence might be granted without majority rule. Mr. Bottomley, the British Commonwealth Secretary, was reported as saying, "We must be satisfied that the basis on which independence is to be

granted is acceptable to the people as a whole." This ambiguous statement was clearly deliberate, and it succeeded in one of its designs. Africa thought that this was merely a tactical move, an endeavour to avoid provoking Smith before Britain was ready to deal with him.

There is no need for me to dwell on the long months of negotiation, threat, and counter-threat, between Britain and Smith in the first ten months of this year. It is sufficient to remember that Mr. Smith went to London once, and that Mr. Wilson went once to Salisbury, in addition to two other Ministerial visits from the metropolitan capital to the colony. To these negotiations Africa had no objection; on the contrary, it welcomed them as indicating that Mr. Wilson was genuine in his desire to avoid U.D.I. and was not going to complicate the issue by standing on his dignity.

But while Africa accepted Britain's willingness to negotiate it had cause to get increasingly worried about the content of the negotiations. There were two causes for the unease; one of them has already proved to be justified, and the other has increased in intensity.

Although U.D.I. was declared to be an act of rebellion there was a studious avoidance by British Ministers of the statement that the rebellion would be brought down by all necessary means, including the use of force. The Smith group were never faced with that prospect. On several occasions British Ministers said "we shall not use force to impose a constitutional solution" to the Rhodesian situation. They never went further. Africa worried, and waited.

Even more serious for Africa was the deliberate vagueness about the ultimate objective of the negotiations and the opposition to U.D.I.

Africa does not oppose U.D.I. because it wishes Southern Rhodesia to remain for ever a colony of Britain. And it certainly does not find the maintenance—or the reassertion—of the 1961 constitution an acceptable goal. The goal of Africa is independence on the basis of majority rule for Southern Rhodesia. The opposition to U.D.I. is because the hope of attaining majority rule, peacefully and reasonably quickly, is compromised by the usurpation of power from a country which is at least in general principle committed to that goal for its colonies. Africa would have been equally opposed to a legal granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia if this were done before majority rule had been attained.

Yet Britain's five principles' which had to be met before independence would be granted by the British Government did not specify the existence of majority rule. On the contrary, they clearly showed that if certain "safeguards" were enshrined in a document, then majority rule would not be insisted upon. There was only one ambiguous statement in principle five which many genuine people—including African leaders—believed provided a safeguard. Principle five stated that any basis proposed for independence must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Many of our friends said that the people of that colony could not possibly agree on an independence without majority rule, and that therefore, so long as this principle was maintained, Rhodesia would not become completely a second South Africa without hope of peaceful progress.

Tanzania was less sanguine; in the Commonwealth Conference I therefore demanded that the words "independence on the basis of majority rule" be included in the final communique. They were not included; and in consequence Tanzania friends thought of the Southern Rhodesia section of the communique. Our British Government was needlessly suspicious. But it was quite clear to us that the British Government was willing to grant independence on the basis of minority rule.

Now it is one month after the Minority Government of Rhodesia has seized power. There is no longer, surely, any problem about "not complicating the negotiations" or "allowing Britain to go step by step in her discussions". But have we yet had the assurance which Tanzania sought in June? The answer is No. The 1961 constitution remains in being, with some few powers having been resumed by the Government in London. This resumption having been forced upon Britain by Smith! Let me quote Mr. Wilson, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, speaking in the House of Commons, London, on 23rd November 1965—"12 days after the rebellion. He said (as reported in the *Times*):

"While we have power to revoke or amend sections of the 1961 constitution we have no present intention of revoking it as a whole, and I cannot at this stage foresee circumstances in which we would do so."

Mr. Wilson went on to deal with the role of this constitution in what he calls "the resettlement period". He said:

"When the Governor is able to report that the people of Rhodesia are willing and able to work on constitutional paths, we are prepared to work together with their leaders to make a new start. For this purpose the 1961 constitution remains in being, though the House will realize the need for those amendments which are required to prevent its perversion and misuse such as we have seen in the last fortnight, and those amendments, too, which are needed to give effect to the five principles to which all parties in this House have subscribed."

It is perfectly true, Mr. Speaker, that later in the same speech Mr. Wilson said:

"All along we have made it plain—we did all throughout the negotiations—that while guaranteed and unimpeded progress to majority rule is the policy of all us, we do not believe it can be immediate . . . But all of us are committed to an early attempt by the Rhodesian people to pronounce on their own future. That was the reason for the suggested referendum and for the Royal Commission."

The thing which I notice in that last statement Mr. Speaker, is that this was not an assurance about majority rule; it was an assurance against majority rule. There is still no statement that independence will be given only on the basis of majority rule.

At the end of last week the British Broadcasting Corporation news service reported that Mr. Wilson had suggested that after all, when British authority was re-established in Southern Rhodesia, there might be a period of direct rule by the Governor with advisors from all races. As this would mean the end of the 1961 constitution I had a moment of hope; we would begin over again. But the report went on to say that Mr. Wilson stressed that majority rule could not come for a very long time—and still there was no suggestion that independence would be held up until this majority rule had finally been attained.

I have spent a long time on this matter because it is important that one thing should be understood. In this matter of objective it is not the timing which is causing Africa to become so angry; we could argue about time. Our anger and suspicion arise from the fact that Britain is not even now—14th December, 1965—committed to the principle "independence only on the basis of majority rule."

I must, however, now move to the question of whether Britain has shown serious determination to get rid of those in Southern Rhodesia who have usurped her power. Africa maintains that she has not.

At this point let me make one thing clear. Africa is not hungry for blood. We do not demand that British troops should die in Southern Rhodesia; we do not demand that Smith's forces should die, if this matter can be settled peacefully no one will be more happy than Africa. But IT MUST BE SETTLED. Further it must be settled QUICKLY. Great principles are at stake. But that is not all. It is also true that the safety of Africa, and particularly of Zambia, is at stake. Africa will therefore co-operate with any EFFECTIVE and determined attempt to deal with Smith without bloodshed; we shall support any proposal which reduces the danger of fighting to the minimum. But we cannot acquiesce in token action, or in inaction. Africa contends that this is what we have had from Britain since 11th November. She has done the very minimum, and left an African State—an African State friendly to Britain—to live under threat to its livelihood from the rebels.

What has Britain done since 11th November?

On that date Mr. Wilson used some strong words: he said "It is an illegal act, ineffective in law; an act of rebellion against the Crown and against the constitution as by law established". But he then went on to instruct the Civil Servants of Southern Rhodesia to "stay at their posts but not to assist in any illegal acts." He was unable to explain how they could do that when they were serving an illegal government.

As regards the use of force Mr. Wilson repeated his stock phrase despite the changed circumstances. Britain would not use force to impose a constitutional settlement he said, but he went on to say that the British Government "would give full consideration to any appeal from the Governor for help to restore law and order". Mr. Wilson refrained from explaining how the law could be more broken than it had been by the usurpation of power. That is to say by treason. He refrained later from explaining how the Governor was to transmit his appeal once the telephone had been taken from him as well as all the furniture of his office, his staff and his transport.

Instead Mr. Wilson obtained the approval of the British Parliament for economic action against the regime. Capital exports to Southern Rhodesia were stopped: exchange restrictions were imposed: Commonwealth Preference was suspended, and a ban was imposed on the British import of Rhodesian tobacco and sugar. The British Foreign Secretary was sent to the United Nations to secure international support for these actions.

The United Nations was highly critical: it demanded further action. Finally, on 20th November Britain accepted a Security Council resolution which included this phrase: "Calls upon all States . . . to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products." In response to this Resolution, first the U.S.A., and then the Federal Republic of Germany, have both turned back cargoes of sugar coming from Rhodesia to fulfil the 1965 quota of that country.

The reaction of the country which claims responsibility for Rhodesia has been rather different. On 23rd November Mr. Wilson spoke to the House of Commons, saying "We are going to study all aspects of trade and oil . . . we are not going in for a trade embargo or oil embargo alone." And in explanation of this he said that there are many difficulties and "there is the position of Zambia to be considered"! That Zambia had supported the resolution appeared irrelevant to the British Prime Minister, who clearly thought he knew the business of that independent African State better President Kaunda. On 1st December Mr. Wilson again said "We are not contemplating an oil embargo immediately."

What is Africa expected to think of this mockery of a U.N. resolution which was already—at Britain's insistence—less than a firm, binding declaration of determination to defeat Smith?

On 1st December, however, Mr. Wilson announced new and much sterner economic measures against Rhodesia. 95 per cent of Rhodesia's exports to Britain were then blocked, and financial measures taken which could have had a fairly quick and fairly severe effect on the economy of that colony. But Mr. Smith of Rhodesia was yesterday reported to have said that these have come too late to affect Rhodesia's economy. I do not believe that he is bluffing. He has only criticism. I have argued that economic sanctions against Rhodesia will not work as long as South Africa is allowed to trade freely with the rebel colony. And it is Britain which has blocked obligatory sanctions under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter.

This brings me to my basic criticism of the British approach. It is a half-hearted approach, but one which leaves Zambia to pay a heavy price.

If effective and obligatory economic measures are instituted, and if alone they can bring down the Smith regime reasonably quickly and allow a new start to be made on the road to independence on the basis of majority rule, then on that basis I should be willing to support them: ON ONE CONDITION. That condition is that Zambia is not left alone to take the consequences of this procedure.

No African State is more concerned than Zambia that the Smith regime shall be defeated. No African President is more concerned that this shall be done without bloodshed and without unleashing a racial or ideological war. We in Tanzania join him in both these ambitions. But the power supplies of the Zambia copper belt are in rebel hands; the power station of the Kariba Dam has been occupied by troops of the rebel regime. Is Dr. Kaunda expected to sit quiet while increasing economic pressure on the rebels makes them more and more desperate, until they finally use their power to interfere with his power supply? What happens to his own economy, and his own peace meantime?

In November, a week after U.D.I., Dr. Kaunda called for British troops to guard the Kariba Dam. A British representative was sent to Lusaka to discuss this request. Later, the British Commonwealth Secretary was sent to Lusaka. The reason? That Britain was only prepared to send troops on conditions—and the conditions amounted to the defence of Rhodesia against attack quite as much as the defence of Zambia against attack from the rebels.

Dr. Kaunda accepted a Royal Air Force contingent because it was essential that his own country have some answer to the Southern Rhodesian and South African planes on his border. But, in the face of tremendous pressure, he has refused to accept ground forces under the conditions which Britain is imposing.

But the fact remains that the British Government has been more willing to use Zambia's difficulties as an excuse for inaction, than it has to use them as a reason for action. For a long time before 11th November, discussions about "contingency planning" proceeded between Zambia, Britain and her allies, and Tanzania. When I opened this Assembly in October I said that Tanzania "will give sympathetic consideration to any request which is made to us for help in furthering the cause of freedom and equality."

What was this for if not to protect Zambia from the effects of any actions against an illegal Southern Rhodesia regime? And why is it not being used?

Let me make one thing clear at this point. Whatever happens as regards our relations with Britain, our commitment to Zambia remains. We continue to be ready to allow the transit of any goods or personnel from any place needed by Zambia to protect her interests and pursue the fight against Smith at the same time.

No one can drive a wedge between Zambia and Tanzania; neither can anyone hide behind Zambia's needs when they are trying to evade their responsibilities.

Mr. Speaker, that is an outline of the charge against the British Government. I could amplify it and speak much longer. I do not think it is necessary. I believe that I have shown that Africa has reason for its action. Reasons for saying that the British Government has not shown serious determination either to get rid of those in Southern Rhodesia who have usurped British power, or to replace them by representatives of the people. I believe that I have further shown that in so far as Britain has taken action which will, in the longer term, cause difficulties for the Smith regime, she has failed to safeguard the interests of that independent African State which stands in hourly threat from that regime. She has failed to live up to the responsibilities she has claimed, and she has failed to protect—or allow others to protect—an independent state which is threatened because of her failure to immediately overthrow the rebel regime.

For these reasons I say that African action directed at Britain is both necessary and appropriate. Africa is entitled to say to this responsible authority "Act now, or allow others to act, or take the consequences."

This is what the Addis Ababa Resolution said. If Britain did not act against Smith before the 15th December African States would break diplomatic relations with Britain.

Let me now move to a consideration of that resolution, and the consequent responsibilities for Africa.

The wording of the resolution can be—and has been—criticised. It called for Smith to be brought down by the 15th December. We are told—may be correctly—that in 13 days this is impossible. But African States are not the fools that some people take them to be. To take an extreme example, it would clearly be absurd for Africa to break diplomatic relations with Britain if by the 15th British troops were moving towards Rhodesia. Africa clearly would not do such a stupid thing. But it is not necessary even for things to have gone as far as that, if Britain has by the 15th demonstrated that at last she means to fulfil her responsibilities, and that she is prepared to pay the price in protecting others if she chooses a slower method, then again it would be absurd for Africa to take action against Britain.

I have myself suggested two things which Britain could do to demonstrate her determination. I understand her preference for economic sanctions; I even share it. But I have said that if she wants this time she must in the meantime protect Zambia. She must apply the full pressure of economic measures, and while these are taking effect she must safeguard Zambia's power supplies by occupying the Kariba Dam and Power Station. This Tanzania—and I believe every other African State—would recognize as willingness to act against Smith.

I have further suggested that, as long as the Kariba situation is safeguarded, it does not matter if the action taken is British. Let her call for the help of the United Nations in dealing with Smith. Let her, for example, ask the United Nations to apply Chapter 7 of the Charter which deals with the mandatory use of force by all members—economic or military force. This would give Britain time to allow economic sanctions to work; it would also give Africa the assurance that military force is not ruled out if it becomes necessary.

This is my interpretation of the Addis Ababa Resolution. I believe it is African's interpretation. I have no reason to believe that any other African State is going to be more illiberal in interpreting that resolution. All we are really asking is that Britain should recognize our interest, and that she should demonstrate to us her determination to defeat the Smith Rebellion, and to put Southern Rhodesia once more on the path to democratic independence.

Britain's reaction so far—we have one day to go—has not been encouraging. We have been told that Britain is not going to be pushed around, in a newspaper interview it is reported that Britain "not standing idly by" if Zambia's power supplies are cut off by Smith still means "acting without bloodshed". And worst of all, because it is an action not words, an oil tanker, hired by a firm of which the British Government hold 51 per cent of the shares, has been told by the same British Government that it may continue on its way taking two weeks' supply of oil to Rhodesia.

Can Africa fail to implement its resolution?

Do African States meet in solemn conclave to make a noise? Or do they mean what they say? The purpose that resolution was to show that Africa requires action against Smith; if that action is not taken do we then shrug our shoulders and sink away without showing that Africa at least know the meaning of the words it uses? Can we—the African States—honourably do nothing to implement our own resolution, or would failure to do so not mean that we are improving on Britain's example of using big words and doing—in our case—absolutely nothing. Britain at least has imposed economic sanctions after her big words. If we fail to implement our resolution we shall have done nothing—less than nothing.

If we ignore our own resolution, neither our suffering brethren in Rhodesia, in Mozambique, in Angola, in South Africa, in South West Africa, nor the broad masses of the people of Africa, or for that matter the non-African members of the United Nations Organization could ever trust Africa to honour a pledge solemnly undertaken by Africa's leaders. Smith will rejoice; Verwoerd will rejoice, Salazar will rejoice. Where can we hide ourselves for shame?

The Addis Ababa Resolution did just one thing which the Accra meeting of Heads of State had not done. At Accra we resolved on a series of measures to be taken under certain circumstances. At Addis Ababa the Foreign Ministers of those Heads of State selected one of those measures and put a date to it. Which of us can say we are not committed to carrying it out?

There are in fact, two States in Africa which can absolve themselves if they wish. One is Malawi; the other is a State outside East and Central Africa. Both of these registered reservations, either at Accra, or at Addis Ababa, or both. There is one other State which no sane person could ask to implement it. That is Zambia. Zambia is bearing enough suffering in Africa's cause; far from asking her to accept more Africa must try to reduce Zambia's present problems by being firm with Britain and Smith.

I make no pretence that the implementation of this resolution will be easy. There are a few states in Africa for whom it is, perhaps, a matter of form. But for many of us the economic cost may be high. We cannot tell exactly how high. But how can we criticise Britain for not being willing to pay the price of freeing Southern Rhodesia and meantime helping Zambia, if we ourselves are not prepared to pay a price to show our own determination? It is easy to call on others for sacrifice. Those who call on Britain without being ready themselves are guilty of a degree of hypocrisy which is unequalled up to now in Africa.

It is said that there is no point in paying this price, because it will have no effect. It will not secure the result we want. Mr. Speaker, I do not think the British Government would agree. No country wishes to be cut off from Africa—free Africa—at this point in our history. They know as well as we do that we are economically and militarily weak. They also know that united we have a strength at the United Nations and elsewhere. If we are prepared to use it, and to be united.

Well, then, it is said, not every African State will in fact, implement the resolution, and so there is no point in anyone doing so. Because this is an African commitment, not a commitment for one state, or two, or even ten.

Mr. Speaker, I do not understand that line of argument. The Organization of African Unity has twice passed a resolution. Each independent African State is a member of that Organization, a sovereign independent member which has voluntarily formed and joined an organization to promote and develop the unity of Africa. They remain sovereign states; Africa is not yet United. Therefore, 36 separate actions have to be taken to implement the resolution instead of only one action. But how can any of us argue that because some other sovereign state may not carry out its obligations, then we will not do so? It is each of us separately which have this obligation; each of us separately which is responsible. It is we ourselves who will have to go to another meeting of the O.A.U. and explain a failure to fulfil a responsibility. For it is our responsibility, and it is not a conditional one. The O.A.U. resolution does not say, this resolution comes into effect once it has been ratified by such and such proportion of states in Africa. One can argue that perhaps it should have done; but it does not. Each separate African state committed itself—with the exceptions I have named—to take action. If we have any respect for international obligations how can we fail to observe our own resolution? If the O.A.U. has any meaning to us, how can we ignore its resolutions?

Earlier I criticised Britain for accepting a United Nations resolution and then failing to implement it. I did not—Africa does not—accept her justification that there is no point in her acting on her own. How then can we use this justification ourselves in relation to another international body of which we have claimed to be loyal members?

Tanzania participated in the resolution at Accra and in the resolution at Addis Ababa. We are committed to it. We are responsible only for the actions of this nation. But for those we, and we alone, are responsible.

The Government feels that Tanzania has no honourable alternative but to abide by that resolution if the conditions are not fulfilled. There is very little time left. I do not intend, on behalf of this country, to take action in accordance with that resolution one minute before we have to do so. We are not proposing to break diplomatic relations with Britain because we wish to do so; we shall do it only if it becomes necessary for our own honour, for the honour of Africa, and as a means of showing our determination never to falter in the campaign against racialism on this continent.

I should perhaps add that breaking diplomatic relations with the British Government does not at present mean that Tanzania will be leaving the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is a multi-national organization, and although it is still true that Britain, for historical reasons, has a very special place in the Commonwealth, it is no longer the British Commonwealth—it is a Commonwealth of free nations. We recognize that because of Britain's special

place in this organization, a diplomatic break by any other member with Britain will impose great strains on it. We hope it will be possible for the organization to withstand those strains and still remain true to its principles.

But loyalty to the Commonwealth, and support for its principles, is impossible without loyalty to the Organization of African Unity.

This is a very simple and inescapable fact, and it should be recognized by those African countries which are now asking us to consider the effect on the Commonwealth of a breach with Britain. Disloyalty to one international organization of which a country is a member implies a lack of trustworthiness in relation to all other international organizations. If we are disloyal to the O.A.U. how can we be trusted to be loyal to the Commonwealth—or the United Nations for that matter?

Can a country which has a record of committing itself in an international organization, and then ignoring its own commitment, be respected in other organizations? Will they respect themselves? And will the Commonwealth really be an organization of equals if some members ignore their international commitments while others abide by them?

The time for African states to consider the effect on the Commonwealth of a breach with Britain was before passing the Accra Resolution—or at least before the Addis Ababa Resolution. Not now. If the African members of the Commonwealth are loyal to the O.A.U. then the Commonwealth has a chance to survive, because its members will respect each other. Otherwise it will be in danger of becoming a shibboleth, and self-respecting Heads of Commonwealth countries will go to Commonwealth Conferences only if they enjoy them as a form of relaxation.

I repeat, for the sake of the Commonwealth, as well as for the sake of the O.A.U. Africa must honour its commitment.

There is one further thing I wish to say, Mr. Speaker, and it is of equal importance with the rest. I ask that every Member of this House accepts full responsibility for ensuring the understanding and the implementation of what I am now about to say.

If it becomes necessary for us to break diplomatic relations with Britain we shall be doing so in support of the principles on which our nation is based. Those principles include anti-colonialism and African Unity, and commitment to international obligations. They also include non-racialism. We are not opposing Smith because he is white; we are not proposing action against the British Government because it is a white government. We are opposing Smith because he is a racialist. If there were to be even one person among us who used this time as an excuse to indulge in racialism directed against white people residing here, that would be a betrayal of our country and the cause we are fighting for. This Government of Tanzania deals firmly with treachery.

In the last elections the people of this country demonstrated that they cared about people, not their race or religion. This is a further, and harder, test of that principle. I am confident that the people of Tanzania will again rise to the challenge.

Let me say a further word about British subjects—for by no means all the white people here are British subjects, or of British origin. We do have working in our public services, and in business, a number of people from Britain. Many of them, indeed I suspect, most of them, are highly critical of their Government

on this matter. Most of them, I believe, will be willing to stay and continue to work with us in Tanzania even if diplomatic relations are broken off between the two Governments. I have already stated that we in Tanzania hope that they will stay. Our need for them will be even greater if the carrying out of our Development Plan becomes complicated by a diplomatic break. I realize that some of these expatriate officials may have financial problems if a break comes; we shall do our best to help where this occurs, and at the moment this matter is under very urgent consideration. I realize, however, that even more important to the majority is the atmosphere in which they and their families live and work. I have already given the assurance of the Tanzania Government that their personal safety will not be endangered by their staying on after the British High Commission staff has gone. I am now asking that, in addition, our people should try to make those who stay realize that we understand their personal unhappiness at this quarrel between two Governments with both of which they are involved, and that we appreciate their choosing to continue serving the people of Tanzania. And those, if any, who wish to go must be allowed to go in peace. This is a quarrel between Governments, not between people.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I do not again expect to address this sitting of the National Assembly. If it becomes necessary I shall ask the Leader of the House to bring a message to you. But I ask you, as always, to conduct any discussions on this very serious matter with a full realization of the importance of your words. You are leaders of our nation; you have a right, indeed a duty, to ask the Ministers for further details of the implications of this decision, this commitment of the Government. You have a right to criticise the Government for making this commitment. I hope you will not—as a body—ask the Government to renounce its commitment. Because it cannot do so and remain the Government. But whatever the House, or the individual members, say, I beg that the words be chosen carefully to serve our objective.

Our objective is the furtherance, on this continent, of justice and peace between men, regardless of race, tribe, or religion.

Mr. Speaker, I ask for the support of this House, and thank you for your attention.