the nationalist movement and the elected government of the new nation.

After the decision to make Tanganyika a Republic, Julius Nyerere was nominated as TANU candidate for the post of President. His opponent received about 3 per cent. of the votes cast in an election based on adult suffrage, and Julius Nyerere was sworn in as President of the Republic of Tanganyika on 9 December 1962, when he entered The State House (formerly Government House), his official residence.

In April 1964, Julius Nyerere was a signatory to the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, and became President of the new United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, later renamed Tanzania.

On 30 September 1965, Nyerere was declared President for a second term of five years, having secured a massive mandate from the people. He obtained more than 24 million votes, representing 96 per cent. of the poll, and on the following day, 1 October 1965, he was inaugurated as President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at a civil and military ceremony in Dar es Salaam’s National Stadium.

INTRODUCTION

TO

Freedom and Unity

Uhuru na Umoja
Introduction

The Tanganyika African National Union was born in July 1954, and modern political development in Tanganyika really begins from that date. But it would be absurd to imagine that this organization, which gathered strength so quickly and so quickly achieved its preliminary goal of independence, sprang out of thin air. Nor is its triumph attributable to any special abilities or virtues of the people of this part of Africa.

The fact is that historical circumstances favoured Tanganyika. It was a Trusteeship Territory under British administration; the groundwork of political organization existed in the form of a multitude of very small welfare and tribal organizations; and the lack of general economic or social development in the country had at least the incidental advantage that there existed no really strong local vested interests supporting the maintenance of colonialism or privilege. In addition, Swahili was understood by the majority of the people—especially the men—almost throughout the territory, and no one tribal group dominated all others in size, wealth and education.

These factors provided an opportunity for the rapid growth of an organized and united demand for self-government; for independence. National freedom—*uhusi*—was an uncomplicated principle, and it needed no justification to the audiences of the first few TANU speakers. All that was required was an explanation of its relevance to their lives, and some reasonable assurance that it could be obtained through the methods proposed by TANU.

The first requirement was not difficult. It is never really difficult for people to acknowledge their own human equality with other men; and it is easy to demonstrate the denial of that equality which is inherent in a colonial situation and the consequent structure of social privilege. In Tanganyika the second requirement
was, at the beginning, more difficult. Memories of the Hehe and Maji Maji wars against the German colonials, and of their ruthless suppression, were deeply ingrained in the minds of our people. So, too, was the fact that our conquerors had themselves been defeated in battle by the British who governed the territory. The people, particularly the elders, asked, ‘How can we win without guns? How can we make sure that there is not going to be a repetition of the Hehe and Maji Maji wars?’ It was therefore necessary for TANU to start by making the people understand that peaceful methods of struggle for independence were possible and could succeed. This does not mean that the people of this country were cowardly, or particularly fond of non-violence; no, they knew fighting; they had been badly defeated and ruthlessly suppressed. As realists, therefore, they wanted to know why TANU thought we could win even without guns.

Such factors determined the strategy of Tanganyika’s independence struggle. They made it possible for TANU to think exclusively in national terms without emphasis on tribal problems. They made it comparatively easy for TANU to eschew tribalism and religious allegiances and to build a real national consciousness. And they determined the initial emphasis on the United Nations.

This thumbnail sketch must not be taken to imply that there were no problems for TANU. The country is divided in religion and it would have been very easy for TANU to have fallen into the trap of religious hostility. That it did not do so is a tribute to religious leaders in this country, but in particular to the adherents of the Moslem faith in the coastal belt—where TANU started. Only after that is it due to the deliberate and inflexible rule of the Party that a man’s religious beliefs were never to be commented upon or used in political argument. Nor would it be true to say that throughout the length and breadth of the country TANU officials always behaved in the most reasonable and long-sighted manner and in accordance with the moral basis of the national campaign. The backwardness of the country meant that most officials of the Party were necessarily people with little or no formal education who did not always see the long-term implications of their attitudes, or of official Party policy. This problem was intensified when the colonial government ruled in Circular No. 6 of 1954 that no civil servant could be a member of TANU.

There was also a huge financial problem for TANU, as the mass of the members were peasant or subsistence farmers and virtually no eligible member had an income approaching the income tax liability range. But perhaps one of TANU’s biggest political problems was to avoid becoming a racialist as well as a racial organization. For until January 1963 TANU was an organization whose membership was restricted racially.

When TANU was formed there already existed a European Association, a number of local Asian Associations, and an African Association which was being replaced by TANU. It was therefore natural that in the context of this segregated colonial society TANU should become an organization for Africans. But it was not inevitable that it should so formally restrict its membership as it did; and indeed the TANU Youth League, which was established in 1956, did not do so—although its non-African members prior to independence could be counted on one hand. The decision that TANU should accept membership only from Africans (later defined as any person having one African parent) was a political decision necessary because of the prevailing lack of self-confidence in the African community. Years of Arab slave raiding, and later years of European domination, had caused our people to have grave doubts about their own abilities. This was no accident; any dominating group seeks to destroy the confidence of those they dominate because this helps them to maintain their position, and the oppressors in Tanganyika were no exception. Indeed, it can be argued that the biggest crime of oppression and foreign domination, in Tanganyika and elsewhere, is the psychological effect it has on the people who experience it. A vital task for any liberation movement must therefore be to restore the people’s self-confidence, and it was quite clear to us that a multi-racial TANU could never do that. There would be too many amongst our people who would believe that any successes of the movement were due to the superiority and assistance of our non-African members. Only by creating and developing our own exclusive organization could we begin to develop confidence in our own abilities or, in the Tanganyika of that time, believe it was really ‘our organization’. For these reasons TANU became a racial organization; yet it was one which, from the beginning, campaigned for racial equality.

Until the end of the nineteen-fifties it could be said that TANU
was campaigning for equality from motives of expedient self-interest. As that decade drew to a close, however, the test came. Were those who claimed equality for themselves willing to accept the other side of the coin—the equality of others?

Inevitably there were some few members of TANU whom discrimination had made bitter, and whose basic lack of self-confidence has caused them to fail in this test. And inevitably there were also those whose membership and participation in the independence struggle had been motivated by greed and jealousy. Such people still exist in Tanzania, as elsewhere in the world. But the masses in Tanganyika and the vast majority of the TANU leadership stood firmly by the moral principles for which they had campaigned. The 1965 elections on the mainland of Tanzania showed, as nothing else could do, that the lessons of the nationalist movement had been learned in this as in other respects. Our people have shown that they accept the objective—the creation of a nation out of more than 120 tribes, out of peoples of different religions and different social groups, and a nation in which race is of less importance than a record of service and an expected ability to give service.

For it is now clear that the independence campaign has had great influence on the attitudes of independent Tanzania, TANU’s emphasis on the morality of its case, and its stress on peaceful methods, has created among the people certain expectations about the actions of their independent nation and its leadership. TANU called for equality; our people now expect it. We called for human respect; our people now demand that their leaders accord it to everyone regardless of his economic or social degree. We called for equality of opportunity; our people are now critical that this does not exist. It is these moral expectations which create both the problems and the opportunities in the very different circumstances of the post-independence period in Tanzania.

There is a further aspect of the independence struggle which is having a continuing effect on Tanzania’s policies. From the formation of TANU until 1961, our movement drew strength from the parallel struggles elsewhere in Africa. We regarded ourselves as part of a continent-wide movement for freedom, and triumphs such as that of Ghana in 1957 heartened us and gave us renewed strength. We saw then that our struggles and our dreams were based on reality; Africa could get free.

Neither was this inter-African involvement a one-way process. TANU recognized the importance of its own struggle to the developments in neighboring countries. It was therefore a founder member of, and a very active participant in, the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) which was formed in 1958, and which gave assistance to weaker parties within its area as well as co-ordinating activities to some extent. TANU also participated actively in the All African People’s Organization Conferences because the interdependence of progress in all parts of the continent was clear to us, and because we recognized that the national boundaries separating our different freedom organizations were artificial. These attitudes of mutual sympathy and interdependence were strong and popular, and they did not cease at independence. They are based not only on the common African desire for freedom, but also on an understanding of the hard facts of reality for Africa in the modern world. For it is as true that happenings in one African State affect events in the others as it was that set-backs or advances in one African nationalist movement affected those elsewhere in the continent.

As a result, the concept of total African freedom and of African unity, remains an accepted objective for independent Africa. Tanzania, for its part, has taken this lesson of unity and integrated it into the very core of its foreign policies. African unity is now as much a principle of action with our Government and people as are the concepts of equality and freedom within Tanzania. The only difference as far as we are concerned is that it is possible to work for freedom and equality within your own country almost regardless of the decisions of others. Unity requires international agreement, and becomes more difficult as nationalistic sentiment gathers strength; also until it does exist each nation has to guard its own interests, even when it knows that these might complicate the progress to unity.

All these aims and principles from the independence campaign are inherent in the policies which Tanganyika, and now Tanzania, has tried to follow since 9 December 1961. It would be stupid to claim that we have never made mistakes and never failed to honour our principles. Our great shortage of educated and experienced people, and our general poverty of resources, has meant that many
things we would wish to do have not been done, and some things
have been done which would have been better left undone or done
in a different manner. But mistakes of inexperience will not
constantly recur; they are of only passing importance in a historical
context—although they may certainly be fundamental for the
individuals involved. The real problem is a universal one. We have
a number of different principles guiding our actions, and a number
of different objectives: sometimes these principles and objectives
clash. What should a nation—or a responsible individual—do
under such circumstances?

There is nothing theoretical about this matter. It is a daily
problem for every Government which has deeply felt purposes,
and it is particularly difficult in a country where the actions of a
few individuals can nullify the efforts of thousands, or even
millions. The principles of individual freedom and the rule of law
require that no person is arrested and held without quickly being
convicted of illegal actions. But we know that we cannot always
get the proof necessary for conviction, especially in cases of
subversion, corruption and intrigue. Yet if we then adhere to
the principles of the rule of law, without any exception, our
young democracy—and these principles themselves—may be
the sacrifice.

There are many other kinds of clashes of principle. Strict
adherence to the principles of equality, for example, would
require that all children are able to go to primary school before
any money is spent on secondary and higher education. But in
that case how shall we be able to develop our country? Again,
do we spread all our services very thinly over the whole territory,
or do we develop one part, hoping that in time it will serve as
a fulcrum to lever the rest out of its poverty?

In a country like Tanzania these are not just questions of
economic priority; they have a fundamental effect on the kind of
society which is built up. For the change which is taking place in
Africa now is so fundamental that the society itself is being
transformed. The traditional order is dying; the question which
has yet to be answered is what will be built on our past and, in
consequence, what kind of society will eventually replace the
traditional one. Choices which involve clashes of principle must
therefore be answered in the light of the kind of society we want
to create, for our priorities now will affect the attitudes and
institutions of the future. We must look ahead and try to gauge
the effect of our decisions in twenty years’ time, not just tomorrow
—although the present cannot be ignored. For in fact this is
another kind of choice which is continually having to be made;
a choice between the present and the future.

A NEW SYNTHESIS OF MAN AND SOCIETY

Man’s existence in society involves an inevitable and inescapable
conflict—a conflict of his own desires. For every individual really
wants two things: freedom to pursue his own interests and his
own inclinations. At the same time he wants the freedoms which
can be obtained only through life in society—freedom from fear
of personal attack, freedom from the effects of natural dangers
which from time to time hit every individual and which cannot
be withstood without help, and freedom to gain rewards from
nature for which his own unaided strength is insufficient. Yet as
soon as an individual becomes a member of society he must
sacrifice, in the interests of the society, certain of the private
freedoms which he possesses outside society. For example, to gain
personal safety a man must surrender his own power to attack
others; to benefit from co-operative endeavour he must at times
co-operate with others regardless of his own particular wishes.
This kind of conflict is inherent in the existence of society—all
societies. It becomes greater the more complicated man’s relation-
ship with his fellows, and the greater his consequent potential
rewards from living in society.

This means that neither the good of the individual as such,
nor the group as such, can always be the determining factor in
society’s decisions. Both have constantly to be served. Yet under-
lying everything must be a consciousness that the very purpose
of society—its reason for existence—is and must be the individual
man, his growth, his health, his security, his dignity and, therefore,
his happiness. Men do not freely agree to participate in social
relations for purposes of material wealth, for efficiency, or for the
glory of the group, except in so far as these things serve them.
Group wealth and group power are not themselves virtues for
which men would sacrifice themselves or for which they should be
sacrificed. They are virtues only in so far as they serve the object
of society—which is man.
It is not any particular man who is the justification for society and all its problems. It is every man, equally with every other man. The equality of all members is fundamental to any social grouping to which an individual freely belongs. By joining a social group—by being a member of it—a man is surrendering certain freedoms. His gain is that others do likewise. If they do not he has not become a member of a society; he has become a slave or a servant of another individual or group of individuals. In such a case there is no hope of stability or harmony within the group; it will continue only as long as power—physical power—remains sufficiently strong to enforce it.

Thus the ideal society is based on human equality and on a combination of the freedom and unity of its members. There must be equality, because only on that basis will men work cooperatively. There must be freedom, because the individual is not served by society unless it is his. And there must be unity, because only when the society is united can its members live and work in peace, security, and well-being.

To ensure that any particular society adheres to its basic purposes two things are required. It must have institutions which safeguard and promote both unity and freedom, and it must be permeated by an attitude—a social ethic—which ensures that these institutions remain true to their purpose and are adapted as need arises. The essential nature of these requirements, and their implications, can be seen most easily in the smallest social unit and the one which was in its time perhaps the most satisfactory to its members—the traditional African family.

The traditional African family was an almost self-contained economic and social unit. Most of the necessities of birth, life, and death could be supplied within the unit on a level which was certainly low, but equally low for all members, and still higher than sub-groups of that family could obtain by themselves.

Despite all the variations, and some exceptions where the institution of domestic slavery existed, African family life was everywhere based on certain practices and attitudes which together meant basic equality, freedom and unity. It was these principles which virtually excluded the idea that one member of the extended family could kill another, or steal from another—it was not any special African human virtue. And there were three vital factors to it. There was an attitude of mutual respect and obligation which bound the members together—an attitude which might be described as love, provided it is understood that this word does not imply romance, or even necessarily close personal affection. The property which is important to the family, and thus to the individual members of it, is held in common. And every member of the family accepts the obligation to work.

These three principles weld the family into a unit which is so obviously important to the individual members that each individual thinks of himself, and of others, in the framework of their membership of the unit. A man or woman knows that he or she is a unique person with private desires. But he also knows that his actions must, for his own good, be restricted to those which are consistent with the good of his social unit—his family. The institution of the family, and its procedures, then encourage that attitude of respect and mutual obligation, and through these means there is created a society which can be harmonious and beneficial for all members equally.

Within the family there is, of course, authority. And usually the authority is the head of the family. But although this authority enables the unit to surmount internal disputes of personality, and enables swift decisions to be taken in times of outside threat, it is not untrammelled. It has its ‘checks and balances’ and is acceptable because it is allied with certain responsibilities. If these are not fulfilled then, over time, the ‘family’ will break up; its members will separate and either join other ‘families’ or set up in their own smaller units. The ‘authority’ is basically the first among equals; his position is based upon the foundation of mutual respect between all members and their common expectation that the compromises which are necessary in all group life will be made by all—including the ‘authority’ himself.

Such expectations presuppose the economic as well as the social integration of the society, and rest squarely on the group’s joint ownership of basic property. It is, and must be, ‘our’ house, ‘our’ food, ‘our’ land, for only under these conditions can equality exist among the members. Personal property does, of course, exist and is accepted. But it takes second place in the order of things. Certainly no member of the family goes short of food or shelter in order that personal property may be acquired by another member. It is family property which matters, both to the family as such and to the individuals in the family. And
because it is family property all members have an equal right to a share in its use, and all have a right to participate in the process of sharing—in so far as time has not created its own acceptable divisions. Indeed, so strong is this concept of 'sharing' that even in relation to private property there develops an expectation of use in case of need; the distinction, however, remains. In the case of family property each individual has a right; in the case of private property there may be an expectation but there is no automatic right.

This principle of sharing is basic to the harmonious family, and is a practical recognition of their equality. The members may not all get an equal share in the food available—this will be determined by need. But they all have an equal right to their share. There is no question of one taking what he wants, and the rest having anything which is left; everything is apportioned, though precedence in receiving or eating has given a false impression to many observers, and inequalities in the shares have sometimes concealed the basic equality of all the participants.

But although the head of the family, and the hunters or warriors or some other group, may get larger portions of food or prior right in shelter, the inequalities between the family members will never be very great. There can be, by the nature of the common ownership, no question of one being satiated or hoarding while another member of the society starves. Even in relation to things like cattle—where ownership rights are a complicated interplay of family and individual possession—individual members of the family who do not 'own' cattle have the right to demand animals from their relations for certain specific purposes. The different shares of different members of the family unit can never get very unequal; all the customs operate to bring them constantly back towards equality. And it would certainly be a major social disgrace for one member of a family, however senior, to be acquiring, for example, personal property in the form of trade, clothes or anything else while another member was denied his basic rights.

It is for this reason that the impact of an individualistic money economy can be catastrophic as regards the African family social unit. The principles of the traditional African family all the time encourage men to think of themselves as members of a society. In contrast, the capitalist and money economy, as introduced into Africa by the trading and colonial powers, operates on the basis of individualism; it encourages individual acquisitiveness and economic competition. A wage-earning member of the family is therefore exposed to luxuries like radios and wrist-watches, and in the wider society his status depends on possession of these things. Yet his responsibilities to the other members of his family remain, and increase with every increase of his wages, because they are the responsibilities of sharing. At this point the traditional small society, and the new wide money-based society, come into direct conflict; and the effects are visible on individuals and on the society throughout Africa today.

This change is not just economic. By introducing the possibility of hoarding wealth through money, by encouraging the acquisitive instinct in man, and by basing social status on material wealth, the very basis of traditional social life is undermined. The economic inequalities between men become so great that man's basic equality is imperceptibly transformed into a merchant and client relationship. It is then impossible for all members of the society to discuss together as equals with a common interest in the maintenance and development of society. The common interest has been at least partially replaced by two interests, those of the 'have's' and those of the 'have-nots'. The unity of society has been weakened because the equality of its members has been broken.

Yet, as it was the right of sharing which served to maintain and strengthen the social unit and make it worth-while to all its members, so there was a corresponding common duty. Every member of the social unit had the obligation to contribute to the common pool of things which were to be shared—in other words, every member of the family was expected to work and accepted the responsibility of working. Some may work in the fields while others hunt or cook; the amount of work expected of an individual varies, and some will be recognized as lazy while others are praised for their energy. But the obligation to work is a recognized part of society, as unquestioned as the right of sharing. If one member appears to be doing less than is warranted by his size and strength, it will be made clear to him in no uncertain fashion that he is not doing enough. He may not agree or he may be discontented with the type of work demanded of him; but he will not question the right of his family to demand work. It does not occur to him that
he has a right to eat and have shelter, and the protection of society, without working for the society. Least of all will he claim to be exempt from work because his father or other ancestor was a successful worker. His equality with other members of the society, his interest in them and their interest in him—all these things he recognizes. And he will accept, at least in theory, that without this universal acceptance of an obligation to work the social unit itself, and he as a member of it, will suffer.

It would be absurd to imply that, because of the application of the principles of love, sharing and work, pre-colonial Africa was an ideal place in which the ‘noble savage’ of Rousseau lived his idyllic existence. The members of this unit were no more ‘noble’ than other human beings and the principles were honoured as much in the breach as in the breach elsewhere in the world. And in any case there was, and is, nothing idyllic about the conditions in which the African family lived. It is poor, insecure, and frequently fear-ridden. But the insecurity and the fear are the consequences of the natural conditions in which the families exist. They arose because the family unit, though well adapted to its environment, was too small and in any case there were too few of them to overcome the environment. As nature could not be controlled, so the family existed out of itself a social unit which was strong enough to withstand all but the worst disasters, and which accepted the necessity for social stability so that the struggle for food and shelter could go on under conditions tolerable to human beings. And social stability was achieved by the establishment of conditions which allowed for individual freedom in the context of social unity, and necessarily on the basis of fundamental equality of membership.

The principles which worked in this one case are equally valid for larger societies because, however large it is, men are always the purpose and justification of society. There are very great problems involved in adapting the principles to really large units where individual brotherhood and interdependence is not as immediately obvious as in the family unit. But they are still the only basis on which society can hope to operate harmoniously and in accordance with its purpose. Unless they are adopted there will always be an inherent, although sometimes concealed, danger of a breakdown in society—that is, a split in the family unit, a civil war within a nation, or a war between nations. Yet it is the principles themselves which are challenged, and few existing societies even claim to be trying to implement them or move towards them.

The principles are challenged first by those who maintain that the purpose of society is not man but a glorification of some abstract notion, such as ‘the nation’, ‘the flag’, or even God. This attitude is derived from the result of confusion between the means and the ends of society. Nations are social groups; in themselves they are either a stage in the development of human society or they are convenient administrative divisions. They are themselves a form of society; how can they be their own purpose? Yet to imagine society as existing to glorify a flag is even more absurd; a flag is nothing but a piece of cloth, and its importance lies only in the fact that it is used to symbolize and strengthen the unity of a particular society. And God—any God—has a relationship only with the individual who has faith in Him; no religion presupposes a God who has a relationship with an abstract noun or only with a collective unit. And certainly our worship of God is itself for the benefit of man, not for the benefit of God. For while worship can do some good for man, or can be believed to do some good for him, it obviously can do no good to perfection—that is to God. An individual’s social living may, of course, be regulated to some extent by his religious beliefs, but these beliefs are not the purpose of his social living, even if a man regards them as the purpose of his life. The purpose of society is in all cases man, although in some cases the institutions of the society will be shaped according to men’s beliefs about the requirements of their spiritual development.

The other major challenge to the validity of the principles of love, sharing, and work as a basis for society is made on the grounds that they are too idealistic, particularly for large groups where the members cannot know each other. This criticism is nonsensical. Social principles are, by definition, ideals at which to strive and by which to exercise self-criticism. The question to ask is not whether they are capable of achievement, which is absurd, but whether a society of free men can do without them. Like democracy, they are easier to approximate to in smaller societies than in large ones. But like democracy, they remain equally valid for both small and large societies—for both traditional and modern Africa.

It was not innate goodness which promoted and maintained
these principles in traditional Africa. They continued because the whole system of education taught them and supported them. They were, and mostly still are in relation to the family, the basic values which a child absorbs from his parents, his elder relations and the whole social organization. The child is indoctrinated with these concepts in practical terms; he is told 'that is your share', 'go to your brother' (when in European terms this man is a distant relative). And he is criticized and punished if he disregards the courtesies due to other members of the social group, or fails to share the remaining food with a late-comer, or ignores the small duties entrusted to him. The young man and the young woman are taught these principles again in their tribal initiation. The principles, without being analysed, permeate and form the purpose of the whole educational system of the tribal society.

If these principles are to be preserved and adapted to serve the larger societies which have now grown up, the whole of the new modern educational system must also be directed towards inculcating them. They must underlie all the things taught in the schools, all the things broadcast on the radio, all the things written in the press. And if they are to form the basis on which society operates, then no advocacy of opposition to these principles can be allowed.

To say this is not a negation of the freedom which the principles claim to uphold. There can be—indeed must be in a changing situation—public discussion about whether particular measures which are proposed support or nullify the principles. But, for example, there can be no public advocacy of inequality between citizens, and no actions which degrade one law-abiding citizen in relation to another. In other words, we must put these principles in the same position as certain other universally accepted attitudes. We do not allow a man to preach in favour of private individual killing because we know that this would undermine the basis of society. We do allow discussion on the questions of abortion and euthanasia because these are particular applications of the principle 'thou shalt not kill'; but we still do not allow anyone to anticipate society's decision on these matters. These are restrictions on individual freedom; we do not regard them as such because we are brought up to accept them as automatic human reactions. For this reason of educational background we do not regard ourselves as having become 'unfree' because of them. In other words we recognize these rules about killing to be an inevitable part of the implications of living in society. Why then would it be a loss of freedom to refuse to allow attacks on the basic equality of all members of society or on the implications of that equality?

There is one very real difference between 'thou shalt not kill' and the principles of equality. The former is an absolute—or can be. Further, it is a negative demand—thou shalt not. Equality, on the other hand, demands positive action; it requires differentiation between men because of their inequalities. To say, for example, that a one-armed old man and an active young man are equal if they each have ten acres of fertile land and a hoe would be to make a mockery of equality. There is, therefore, no absolute and simple rule which can be easily applied everywhere and to all aspects of life in relation to equality. Instead we are forced back to concepts of human dignity; every member of society must have safeguarded by society his basic humanity and the sacredness of his life-force. He must both be regarded, and be able to regard himself, as the human equal of all other members in relation to the society. It is this need which makes economic inequalities so dangerous, and which make so abhorrent and destructive 'police state activities' where an individual's pattern of life is at the mercy of arbitrary decisions of another individual.

Yet even in this connection there can be a conflict. There is no human dignity in extreme poverty or debilitating disease—or in the ignorance which buttresses these things. Neither is there very much virtue in sharing nothing when joint effort could provide, after a period, the goods which make life more comfortable. Further, man's progress needs that economic 'surplus' which enables some members of society to desist from production for current consumption, in favour of those activities which ultimately lift the whole society into new satisfactions of an aesthetic or philosophical nature. The purpose of society is man; but in order to serve man there must be a social organization of economic activities which is conducive to the greater production of things useful for the material and spiritual welfare of man. This means that it may well be a function of society to organize and sustain efficient economic organization and production techniques, even when these are in themselves unpleasant or restrictive. For production is important. It is important to the extent that it serves
man, and his interests as he currently sees them. But production is not the purpose of society; humanity’s progress must be measured by the extent to which man is freed from the domination of the need to produce. When the demands of ‘efficiency’ and ‘production’ override man’s need for a full and good life then society is no longer serving men, it is using him.

Because the requirements of these principles will inevitably vary from one society to another at any one time, and from time to time in any society, no ‘sacred book’ is possible which can tell future generations how to attain the ideal. The ideal has never yet been attained; it may never be. But the fact that murders continue in every society does not prevent every society trying to eliminate them, to reduce their causes and discourage the expression of man’s violent instincts. Similarly, in regard to the wider purposes of society; we have to organize our institutions and build attitudes which promote universal human dignity and social equality. In other words we have to promote the growth, and encourage the expression, of the attitude which asks a particular kind of question when considering decisions. The question ‘What profit would I myself get?’ must be socially discouraged; it must be replaced by the question ‘What benefit, and what loss, will be obtained by the people who make up this society?’

If we are ever to reach this position many of our present societies have to change direction. Africa in particular is now moving away from such attitudes. We must therefore take positive action to re-inspire the acceptance of these principles, and to make their implementation possible in the larger societies which have developed out of the family and the tribe.

This is not going to be easy, for it means that Africa has to tackle at the same time the problems of increasing our production and rebuilding attitudes of equality. This is a difficult combination, particularly at a time when there is a desperately short supply of the special skills needed to secure an increase in our abysmally low productivity. For example, the wage differentials in Tanzania are now out of proportion to any conceivable concept of human equality. A few individuals can command incomes of up to £3,000 a year, while the minimum wage is £60 a year, and many farmers receive less. Yet we cannot at present greatly reduce this gap because of our shortage of skilled and qualified people, and the great demand which exists for their services from Government, from the private investment organizations we need to encourage, and even from international or overseas institutions. This means that the few people with special skills get offered a larger and larger share of the resources of society in return for the application of their skills. This happens despite the fact that these skills were acquired as a result of the communal effort of society, when it provided scholarships or built and maintained our own secondary and technical schools and our university.

This is not happening because our skilled people are particularly evil or selfish; in fact the vast majority are remarkably dedicated to the task of building our country. But the social organization is at present such that these great personal rewards are available to individuals; it is asking for universal sainthood to demand that all of them should renounce these opportunities. Yet the danger to our society nonetheless exists. For such differentials in economic levels easily come to be taken for granted as correct; and they lead to social differentiation and attitudes supporting inequality. They encourage the attitude of mind where groups of specialized wage-earners, whose services we need, claim more pay because of the comparative incomes of other specialized groups whose society they aspire to join. It does not seem to happen that anyone compares himself with those at the bottom economic level.

It is essential, therefore, that we in Tanzania, as a society, should recognize the need to take special steps to make our present situation a temporary one, and that we should deliberately fight the intensification of that attitude which would eventually nullify our social need for human dignity and equality. We have to work towards a position where each person realizes that his rights in society—above the basic needs of every human being—must come second to the overriding need of human dignity for all; and we have to establish the kind of social organization which reduces personal temptations above that level to a minimum.

The spreading of such attitudes and the introduction of such institutions must be an important purpose of the policies of the Government of Tanzania. It is described as a socialist purpose, for the deliberate regulation of society for the purposes of equality and human well-being is a socialist doctrine. But we are ‘African Socialists’; we operate in Africa and the road to our goal will be determined in large part by the economic and social conditions which now exist in this continent. This is not to claim a special
virtue in 'African Socialism'; we adopt it because we have to move
towards the socialist goal of human equality and dignity along the
road which is appropriate to us. It is simply a recognition that if
two people are going to India, one from Africa and the other from
Japan, the former will move east and the latter will move south-
west. The destination of all true socialists is probably the same,
but the path will be largely determined by the starting point.

THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL UNITY

Indeed, even to talk of 'African' socialism is something of a
misnomer. As Africa has been organized into nation states, and
because these nation states have been differently developed, there
will even be variations of African socialism. For, although African
nations are very artificial creations of man (indeed, of European
men) sixty years of history means that they are the basic societies
from which our development must now start. We have to recognize
the existence of about forty separate sovereign states, separate
societies which are linked together geographically, economically
and—at the moment—psychologically, but are still separate.
Each of these nations is, at present, the 'society' within which
these transformations have to take place.

This has very serious implications. For although there is no
rationality in nation states, they are the grouping within which
society organizes itself and protects itself. Social rules of behaviour
operate only inside these boundaries; only within them can it be
enforced. This means that relations between these 'societies', and
between individuals who are members of different societies, are
regulated only by the self-interest of the respective groups. Each
nation therefore feels it to be necessary to build a system of self-
defence—by which it means defence of its own interests—and to
spend time and money protecting itself from being used by other
nations more powerful than itself. Frequently indeed nation states
build their own internal unity by fabricating, or exaggerating,
their division from other nations.

Thus we have in the world now a situation where a large number
of different little societies are trying to pursue their own kind of
social organization separate from, and even in opposition to,
other social groups, while there is no universally accepted code of
behaviour between groups. Internally each state tries to harmonize,
or at least control, relations between its citizens and residents.
Exteriorly the law of the jungle operates, ameliorated only by
considerations of long-term, as against immediate, benefit.

This is obviously absurd. The technology of the twentieth
century straddles the world and yet we try to operate social
relations as if national boundaries created impenetrable barriers
between different peoples. It is essential that our concept of
society be adapted to the present day; only then will any of our
present social groupings really be free to pursue their own policies.
Nations are now acting like individuals who have not formed a
society; they resist the suggestion because they realize that to form
a society means surrendering certain freedoms in order to gain
others. Yet year by year the need for an organized society becomes
clearer; the question which remains is whether it will be formed
before disaster occurs.

At the moment the talk of a 'World Government'—which is
what a world society implies—is day-dreaming. It is very logical
dreaming and very necessary. But it is not likely to become a
reality soon. Throughout the world nation states have been so
successful in creating concepts of an exclusive internal unity that
almost all peoples are now terrified by the thought that someone
from 'outside' will have power over them; they do not seem able
to realize that they will also have power over others. This means
that, necessary as it is, we are just not going to create a world
government in this century—unless of course, some unforeseeable
event transforms present-day human attitudes.

We have therefore in this respect, as in others, to work up to
the goal, starting from the present position. We have to re-
join in the very imperfect United Nations and have to work to
strengthen it. At present it is faltering because of the inequalities
between its members and because there has been no agreement
by the members to give it independent strength. Yet it is an
institution which can even now be built up, and just as it is the
weaker men who in the short run gain most from the organization
of human society, so too, in the short run, it is the small and weak
nations who most urgently need the organization of a world
society. It is therefore countries like Tanzania which must put in
the extra effort which is necessary to make the United Nations
succeed in its present endeavours, so that it can grow or be replaced
later by a stronger body, as circumstances demand.
Yet there is more than one way in which the present-day African societies can reduce the dangers to themselves which come from the proliferation of nation states. While we work towards world unity, we can create unity in our continent. Or, if African unity is still too big a step to take at once, then we can create greater African unity by unions, federations or mergers of the present nation states, so that the number of sovereign societies in Africa is reduced.

These preliminary steps need not be day-dreaming. If we have courage and intelligence they can become reality in the immediate future. And certainly they are essential if the ordinary African citizen is ever really to overcome the poverty which at present grips him and if he is to increase his degree of personal safety. For this is, and must be, the purpose of greater unity in Africa as elsewhere. Not size for its own sake, but strength and power used to defend the real freedoms of the ordinary man and to help him progress in his freedom.

THE VITAL NATURE OF THE SOCIAL ETHIC

But one thing is inescapable. Whatever the size of the society and whatever its institutions, the freedom and well-being of its members depends upon there being a generally accepted social ethic—a sense of what things are right, and what things are wrong, both for the institutions in relation to the members, and for the members in relation to each other. This social ethic has to change over time as people's consciousness changes, and as physical circumstances change. In Africa now the social ethic is changing, and has to change, from one appropriate to a tribal society to one appropriate to a national society. And because it is in a state of transition, Africa now has an opportunity to build an ethic appropriate to the development of a good and stable society or allow one to develop which contains the seeds of future strife and confusion.

It is my belief that we in Africa must seize the opportunity we now have, so that a new attempt can be made to synthesize the conflicting needs of man as an individual and as a member of society. This book is published in the hope that it will contribute to such a development, by extending understanding of our basic purposes and of the problems which have to be overcome. But most of all, it is intended that it shall contribute to the growth of those social attitudes which must underlie harmonious living for men in society.

The selection, from a very large quantity of material, of the speeches and writings included in this book has been made with those purposes in mind. At the same time an attempt has been made to give an historical understanding of the development of Tanzania and of the philosophy which it is trying to practice. For these reasons speeches of only topical importance have been omitted except where the stand taken illustrates an attitude. It is for the same reason that some speeches are recorded only by very short extracts, while others are included in full.

Even so, it has been found necessary to omit references to certain very important subjects. Speeches and writings on Trade Union subjects are not included in this book, nor is there very much reference to economic planning except in the broadest terms. The emphasis is on equality and its implications, on democracy in Tanzania, and on unity—within Tanzania, within Africa, and in the world. These are the subjects which our circumstances have made most pressing to us and which themselves spill over into matters of industrial and economic organization.

It is also true that the emphasis within these subjects has been determined by Tanzania's history, and Africa's general development. In the speeches on human equality, for example, great stress is laid on the question of racial equality; it is only in the last year or so that Tanzania's circumstances have made this aspect less immediately dangerous than economic inequalities between citizens of African descent. And even now, the reverberations of events in southern Africa mean that we cannot relax our guard against racism.

CHANGE IS THE DEFINITION OF AFRICA

Throughout these speeches and writings, and through all the activities of the Governments which I have been privileged to lead and support, there is however one recurring practical theme. It is the theme of change. For Africa must change; change from an area where people eke out an existence and adapt themselves to their environment, to a continent which challenges the environment and adapts it to man's need. Africa must change her institutions to make feasible her new aspirations; her people must change their attitudes and practices to accord with the objectives.