AFTER
THE
PEARCE
COMMISSION

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In considering the policies to be adopted after the publication of the Pearce Commission Report, it is vital to remember our objective in relation to Southern Rhodesia. That objective is now, as it has always been, the attainment of independence for Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule, and under conditions which allow the development of human dignity for all citizens, and of equality between them all. That is the goal for Tanzania, as for the people of Rhodesia themselves. Further, we would prefer — and it is evident that they would prefer — to attain this goal by peaceful means.

The prime responsibility in this struggle for self-determination for Zimbabwe rests with the people of that country. The role of Tanzania, as of other free African states, is to support the Zimbabwean people by whatever means are within our power, but not under any circumstances to try and control either their struggle or the decisions they make in relation to it. The question at issue is freedom for the people of Zimbabwe. It can only be won by them, and the shape it takes is for them to determine.

The free nations of the world, and especially the free nations of Africa, nonetheless have an important role to play in the Zimbabwean struggle for freedom, and they are all affected by it. In legal terms Rhodesia is still a British colony. But its future is now a world issue, and especially an African issue. All those countries which have expressed a belief in the fundamental equality of man regardless of colour are involved, as are all those who claim freedom for themselves. For the right to freedom exists, and is indivisible. This is, and must be, acknowledged by all those African states whose freedom owes little or nothing to the economic or military power marshalled by their people. If we claim freedom for ourselves —
and we do — and if for ourselves we reject domination by a racial minority — and we do — then we must take the same position in relation to Zimbabwe. We have to support the Rhodesian struggle for freedom on the basis of human equality. We are involved in its success, in the methods by which that struggle is won, and especially in the international consequences of that struggle.

It is for these reasons that Tanzania has always demanded that the independence of Southern Rhodesia should be acknowledged only after majority rule exists there. Recognising the independence of Rhodesia before the majority of its people are in a position to control their own government would not be an act of anti-colonialism. It would be to perpetuate the worst kind of tyranny — the kind which is based on a man’s race and colour.

The demand for NIBMAR is thus not an acquiescence in colonialism — it is a recognition that the only kind of independence which is meaningful is one which leaves a people in control of their own affairs. Independence based on the “5 Principles” enunciated by successive British Governments would not leave Rhodesia in that position; it would leave the majority at the mercy of a racial minority. Not even Principle 5 — the need for the British Parliament “to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole” — meets this fundamental point. For to ask a people whether they agree to being ruled by a local minority is like asking a slave which master he agrees to have, when his demand is for the end of his slavery.

The settlement between Ian Smith and Sir Alec Douglas-Home was therefore of interest to Tanzania only insofar as it demonstrated the strength or weakness of the Smith regime after six years of illegal independence, and the intensity of the current British Government’s commitment to its proclaimed belief in human equality and national freedom. The proposals showed the position very clearly. While Smith wanted an end to sanctions and the recognition of Rhodesia’s independence by the major Western powers, he was still willing to make only face-saving gestures to achieve these ends. The British Government, on the other hand, was willing to settle for face-saving camouflage, subject only to an appearance of African acquiescence in the betrayal of the Rhodesian people.

The Pearce Commission was expected to register the necessary acquiescence. Everything which was said and done by the British Government, by British business, and by the Smith regime after the ‘settlement’ and before the Pearce Commission arrived in Rhodesia, makes clear the confidence with which a ‘yes’ answer was expected. Indeed, even Tanzania underestimated the political consciousness and political bravery of the people of Zimbabwe, and feared that the Pearce Commission might report a ‘yes’ answer.

But in fact, the African people seized the opportunity created by the intended facade of consultation and spoke clearly and unmistakably. They converted the facade into a reality by the sheer force of their united opposition to the proposed settlement as a basis for independence. Denied their old leadership, who remained in detention or in prison, the African people organised themselves to spread an understanding of the Proposals and their meaning in the future. As a result the answer given to the Pearce Commissioners, by an overwhelming majority, was an African ‘No’ — the basis proposed for independence was not acceptable to them.

In the face of this answer the Pearce Commission met its responsibilities and itself gave an honest answer to the questions which had been put before it. While their own feeling that the settlement should
have been accepted comes through very clearly, the
Commissioners made no attempt to hide or disguise
the unpalatable truth — the Africans rejected
the proposals as a basis for independence.

The Validity of the Pearce Commission Report.

In considering the implications of this development,
it is necessary to acknowledge that in one respect the
job given to the Pearce Commissioners was a ridiculous
one. The Commission was given two questions to
answer: (a) Had the proposals been fully and properly
explained to the population of Rhodesia? (b) Did
the people of Rhodesia as a whole regard them as an
acceptable basis for independence?

The first question is dealt with in the Report by an
explanation of what was done to publicise the Proposals
and by discussion of the people’s comments and
response at meetings and in private interviews. The
Commission concluded that the “people of Rhodesia as
a whole” did have a sufficient understanding of
the Proposals to give validity to their answer to the second
question.

The main difficulty about getting an answer to the
Commissioners’ second question, however, was the
question itself. For it was of the type: ‘When did
you stop beating your wife?’; there was no possible
straight and simple answer. This is best illustrated
by the comment of Ian Smith, who is reported to have
said if the Africans replied ‘No’ to the Commission,
then that would mean that they were satisfied with things as
they were. In the event, the Africans took the question
at its face value and said they were not satisfied with
the Proposals as a basis for independence. It is
only because of the fullness of the Pearce Commission
Report that their dissatisfaction with, and distrust of,
the Smith regime is spelled out so that it becomes
impossible to draw the conclusion which Ian Smith
desired to draw.

But, be all that as it may, there is no doubt that the
visit of the Pearce Commission, and its Report, have
affected the Rhodesian situation and especially the
world’s view of it. The Report and the British
Government’s reaction to it must therefore be taken
seriously.

In this connection it is necessary to acknowledge
that every Commission of investigation or enquiry,
anywhere in the world, has a built-in bias created by the
education, life experience, and value system of the
Commissioners. The Pearce Commission was no
exception to this rule, and indeed the Commission’s
realisation of this is shown by the way in which the
Report gives outline biographies of the Commissioners.
Its members were uniformly white although they
were operating in an area of racial conflict; they were
men who had a good education, often in British
public (i.e., private) schools. They were men who for
reasons of family background, as well as intellectual
ability, had no personal experience of longterm un-
employment; the Commissioners were men who had,
often during extensive colonial service, been “masters”
rather than “servants”.

It is important to recognise this built-in bias when
considering the conclusions of the Commission. For
it means that the Commissioners would generally tend
to be sympathetic with established authority rather
than with those fundamentally critical of it or in
opposition to it. And this is reflected in the Report,
as for example in the Commission’s failure to under-
stand the seriousness of even an implied threat to the
job of a man who has no other foreseeable means of
livelihood. Their background — as well as the
circumstances under which they were operating —
explained also their great sensitivity to points raised
by the Rhodesian authorities on grounds of law and
order. The Report makes clear that the Commissi-
oners altered their original plans on a number of
occasions because of such arguments. For example, they gave up plans to hold public meetings in Salisbury and none was held; public meetings in other urban areas were sometimes postponed at the last minute at the request of the authorities (sometimes with disastrous results, as at Umtali); prior announcements about the arrival of the Commissioners and their meeting places were frequently not made because of an alleged danger of unrest; some tribal Trust Lands were not visited; and a proposed public opinion survey was not made.

Yet there was another respect in which the background of the Commissioners made them insist on doing their job honestly and to the best of their ability. They rejected the original procedures suggested by the Rhodesian authorities because these could not have led to conclusions which would command "respect in Britain and elsewhere". Despite many difficulties they worked hard to obtain opinions from the widest possible cross section of the population and from practically all geographical areas. They made great efforts to circulate widely, and among ordinary people, the summary of the proposals which they had themselves prepared. And they refused to accept official hospitality and White Rhodesians' judgment as to whether the Africans had any opinions or what opinions they held. The Commission investigated things for itself.

In the event, the Commission expressed reservation about the understanding of the proposals, and about the opinions expressed, only in relation to two sections of the African population. First, they did not obtain as many opinions as they would have liked from domestic servants in Salisbury — who apparently comprise nearly 40 per cent. of the adult African population of that city. House-to-house visits were obviously impossible and there were no public meetings. The Commission does not appear to have understood the suspicion, and possible lack of opportunity, which would undoubtedly have discouraged the majority of people in domestic service from expressing an opinion possibly contrary to that of their employers, when such opinions might become known to those employers.

Secondly, as regards the Africans employed on European farms or in the mines, the Report says: "In general our Commissioners reported that the more remote the area and the smaller the concern, the more likely it was that the workers there would lack any depth of understanding of the issues involved, and that they would reflect the views put to them by their employers. Conversely, Africans at the larger or more accessible centres tended to support the nationalist viewpoint and reject the Proposals. ........ We therefore feel considerable doubt as to the acceptability or otherwise of the Proposals amongst this section of the population." (para. 248).

The Conclusions of the Pearce Commission Report.

The total of the evidence marshalled by the Pearce Commission has, however, been incontrovertible. They held many meetings in the rural areas, they interviewed many individuals and any group which wished to see them, and they visited farms, factories and offices. The Commissioners also made impromptu stops and talked to bystanders at random, as well as making unannounced visits to places where people were gathered for social or work purposes.

The conclusions of the Commission were clearly stated:

"We believe that taking into account the explanation given by the Rhodesian authorities, the activities of those opposing or promoting the Proposals, the distribution of our simplified version of the Proposals and the explanations given by the Commission at meetings and over the radio, the great majority of those who gave us their opinions had a sufficient
understanding of the content and implications of the Proposals to enable them to pass judgment on them. We are satisfied that the Proposals have been fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia.” (para. 419).

“We are satisfied on our evidence that the Proposals are acceptable to the great majority of Europeans. We are equally satisfied, after considering all our evidence including that on intimidation, that the majority of Africans rejected the Proposals. In our opinion the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the Proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence.” (para. 42).

Nothing is Settled.

The British Government has informed Commonwealth Governments that it accepts the conclusion of the Pearce Commission that the settlement Proposals are not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; the British Government also said that it will shape its future policy in the light of this conclusion. But obviously this does not “solve” the Rhodesian issue. It merely means that the Smith regime continues in power in Rhodesia; that it continues to be regarded as illegal, to be without international recognition, and that sanctions against it continue.

But it would not be true to say that the situation has therefore returned to what it was previously. The power situation is the same, but the effect of the Commissioners’ visit to Rhodesia, the African reaction to that visit, and the Report itself, can never be undone. It is the implications of these things which have to be considered in answering the question “What now?”.

If no further external action is taken, the immediate result of the African ‘no’ is likely to be an intensification of oppression within Rhodesia, further development of the close link-up which now exists between South Africa and the Rhodesian authorities, and even more rapid steps towards apartheid in the colony itself. All these trends were present before the so-called agreement between Ian Smith and Sir Alec Douglas-Home. They would not have been precluded by the settlement if this had been accepted by the Africans: indeed they would have taken place in a more favourable international climate. But the real point is that the Pearce Commission Report gives a new opportunity for international action against the regime, as it shows the real meaning of the regime. It therefore gives a new, though faint, possibility of avoiding widespread violence in Rhodesia.

It is relevant to remember, for example, that when independence was first declared by Ian Smith, the South African Government was very slow in giving active support to the regime. Before committing itself deeply, the South African Government wanted to see what action Britain was intending to take. Its concern was to avoid jeopardising South Africa’s apparent immunity to hostile international action which rests heavily on the legal sovereignty of South Africa, so that many nations are reluctant to create a precedent of “interfering in the internal affairs of an independent nation”. Now we have a similar situation. South Africa is unlikely to reduce the assistance it is already giving (which is very considerable indeed); but it is likely to wait before going any further in order to see how the world reacts to the Africans’ clear repudiation of their rulers.

Similarly, at least a few of the white people in Rhodesia may have been shaken by the African reaction to the Proposals. For it is probable that some had been living under the illusion that “their Africans were happy”, or at least uninterested in government. Difficult as it was to maintain this sort of ignorance before the Pearce Commission, it is
surely impossible now. But it has yet to be seen whether this will result in any appreciable alteration in the dominant attitude of the minority community. The evidence so far does not give cause for hope.

Yet it is presumably this factor to which Sir Alec Douglas-Home was referring when he spoke of the need for "a time for reflection, particularly by Rhodesians." For there is no possibility of the Africans changing their minds; the Pearce Commission Report makes it clear that there was no sign of any change in African opinion towards the end of their stay. Further, the reasons given by Africans for their opposition to the Proposals stem from their deep frustration and humiliation at the kind of life which is imposed on them by the white minority government.

Nor is there the slightest chance of Ian Smith suddenly being converted to a belief in human equality and dignity. His reaction to the Report is evidence enough for that. And even if there were to be a second miracle on the road to Damascus, it would not help the situation; for in that event it is clear that Smith would immediately be removed from power.

In fact, a change in the situation can only come from a radical alteration in the power structure of Rhodesia. For this reason it is not enough for Sir Alec Douglas-Home to commend the view of those who he says are clearly intent upon furthering multiracial co-operation, nor to express hopes for the "way of compromise". The possibility of compromise is clearly there — on the African side. The Pearce Commission Report makes clear that the vast majority of the Africans who discussed the future with the Commission were not demanding immediate adult suffrage or even immediate majority rule. They were simply saying that there must be no independence until these objectives were accepted and until the Africans had a degree of power which would effectively prevent any back-sliding — which, in practice, means no independence before majority rule. On the objectives themselves, compromise is clearly as unacceptable to the Africans of Rhodesia as it would be to the rest of Africa.

This means that the only chance for "the way of compromise" is if the British Government acts to assert its authority, and thus to change the present Rhodesian power structure. Indeed it is now only through actions by Britain and other world powers that Rhodesia can be saved from a future of increasing violence as the Africans give up hope of external assistance and turn to the only course left open. For they do still hope. It may seem strange that, after everything which has happened in the last ten years, the Rhodesian Africans still look to Britain for assistance in their plight. To many African nationalists this lack of self-reliance may be appalling. But it stems from a realisation of what the alternative would mean to all Rhodesian citizens. Guerilla war is brutal, horrible, and destructive to innocent and guilty, victim and oppressor alike. It is to be avoided if possible.

Yet such a war cannot be avoided by tricks. No new "settlement", agreed between Smith and the British Government, will circumvent its probability. For the Africans are now politically conscious and will not agree to any independence which fails to give them power over their own future. Nor will any new and different method of meeting the "5th Principle" after any such future agreement avoid this horrible destiny. The Africans demand reality, not window-dressing, and Rhodesia will be saved from eventual war only if they obtain justice by other means.
Sanctions.

It is early yet to say whether that is likely to happen. In presenting the Pearce Commission Report to Parliament, Sir Alec Douglas-Home has said that sanctions will be continued until it is possible to "judge whether an opportunity for a satisfactory settlement will occur once again". Leaving aside the obvious fact that the last proposed settlement was not satisfactory so that there is no question of an opportunity occurring "again", his statement is a very unsatisfactory comment on current needs. The Rhodesian authorities have received a damaging blow to their self-confidence. The result will be an intensification of their effort to consolidate power; this must be matched by an intensification also of the effort to undermine the minority regime.

This can be done. Certainly sanctions have not brought down the Smith regime even after six years. Their effect has been weakened by the actions of South Africa and Portugal, and by evasions from other countries. Yet it was, and is, sanctions which make the Europeans long for a settlement. The Pearce Commission Report makes this quite clear and says "the overall impression left was a deep desire for a settlement and less enthusiasm for the Proposals themselves". (para. 288).

In fact while sanctions have not caused a failure of the rebellion, and are unlikely to do so, it is obvious that they are gradually undermining what is sometimes referred to as the "Rhodesian way of life", but which is in fact the minority way of life. The white Rhodesians' comfort, ease, security and future expectations are being destroyed, and they are being forced to realise that some change is inevitable.

Yet the real choice before the minority in power is a limited one. They can — and it appears that they will — try to move completely into an open apartheid system. The facts, however, are against them; the sort of "peace" which South Africa maintains at huge expense is hardly possible for a country where the white minority makes up less than 5 per cent. of the population as against 20 per cent. in South Africa itself. To counteract this, the question of amalgamation into, or federation with, South Africa may be mooted; but it is highly unlikely that South Africa would welcome an addition of more than 3 million Africans and only 230,000 whites. Nor can the Rhodesian whites rely upon Rhodesia's other white-dominated neighbour, Mozambique; the Portuguese are already in trouble from the Freedom Fighters operating there under the leadership of Frelimo, and are in no position to give any military or financial assistance to the minority regime of Rhodesia.

Sooner or later the Rhodesian minority will therefore be forced to face the true choice which lies before them. They will certainly wriggle for some time; but events will show that they can choose only between increasing unrest and violence leading to a real war of liberation by the African people, or a gradual move towards majority rule before independence. The great advantage of sanctions to those who prefer to avoid violence is that they keep open for longer the possibility of majority rule coming through peaceful change.

For foreign powers, sanctions have another advantage. They delay, even if they do not ultimately prevent, the polarisation of the world over the Southern Africa situation. For when Eastern and Western bloc countries both support sanctions against Rhodesia, a confrontation in that area is avoided. This is no small matter for world peace, or for African freedom. For at present, although Britain and other Western powers consistently claim to be opposed to racialism and apartheid, they show the greatest reluctance even
to support effective criticism of South Africa; their actions are dominated by the fact that the home of apartheid is a legally independent sovereign state whose trade is valuable to them. The Western Powers also refuse to exert effective pressure on Portugal despite their claim to be against colonialism. The Communist Powers — for ideological, historical and economic reasons — are less inhibited in their support for the African cause. The result is a potential field of international conflict, the implications of which must be clear to all.

Sanctions against Rhodesia, on the other hand, provide Western countries with a cheap way of lending — at least temporarily — some credibility to their proclaimed opposition to racialism and minority rule. The country is not legally independent, and its exports are unimportant to the trade of any country and are easily substitutable (except for Zambia). Indeed for some countries international sanctions have even resulted in an increase in their exports, as nations like Zambia have turned to others in an endeavour to overcome the economic inheritance which bound them to the Rhodesian economy. For example, the increase in British exports to Zambia, from 26.8 million Kwacha in 1964 to K82 million in 1970, is due in no small part to Zambia's tremendous achievement in cutting its imports from Rhodesia from K61.7 million in 1964 (when Rhodesia was the largest source of Zambian imports) to K23.2 million in 1970.

Sanctions are in fact an essential weapon in the Rhodesian struggle. They must be continued for as long as is necessary to force the Rhodesian minority into accepting two elementary facts of modern life — that 5 per cent. of the people of any country cannot indefinitely enforce their will on the rest, and that the world rejects racial solutions to social problems. Further, it must be known that they will continue. The existence of reasonable hope that sanctions will be ended before the principle of NIBMAR is accepted simply undermines African belief in the possibility of a peaceful remedy to their ills, and reduces the chances of effective sanctions enforcement while they are supposedly being applied. It is not irrelevant that many "binding" trade agreements and contracts were signed with foreign firms after the "agreement" between Smith and Home was announced.

Even this is not enough. The enforcement of present sanctions must be greatly tightened up, and sanctions must be extended — none of which is impossible.

Tightening up can be achieved by three quite easy methods. Firstly, allegations of sanctions-breaching (such as those which Sir Alec Douglas-Home said he had referred to the United Nations Sanctions Committee) must be publicised immediately, so that every Government, and all workers who may be involved in moving Rhodesian goods, know what is being attempted and where. Secondly, the United Nations must agree that any cargoes from Rhodesia being exported contrary to sanctions will be seized by the country of destination or transit, and the return from the sale of these goods paid to the United Nations for use in humanitarian work among refugees from Southern Africa or in the liberated areas of Southern Africa. Thirdly, the countries of Africa should take all appropriate steps to "reward their friends and damage their enemies".

The first two steps are self-explanatory. They require an act of political will; after that, any complicated details (especially of point 2) can be worked out. The third point makes special demands upon African states, commensurate with their special interest in, and responsibility for, the total liberation of Africa and the end of racialism on our continent.
Every African state has specially close links with one or other of the major world powers — either because of their colonial history or for other reasons. And it is not true that these relationships are totally one-sided in their advantage. In the first place, the European nations which give aid solely for altruistic reasons are very few indeed; in the second place, trade only takes place if it is to the advantage of the stronger power — even when the weaker has no alternatives. Thus, each African nation has a lever which can, at the very least, be used to draw the attention of some foreign Governments to strongly held African opinion. African countries which are members of the Commonwealth have an easy means of expressing their view to other Commonwealth Governments; franc zone countries have similar access to the French Government. Japan has large trade interests in some parts of Africa; Liberia has a special relationship with the United States of America; West Germany is developing links with certain African states, as are the various countries of the Eastern bloc; and so on.

These special links do not mean that African countries should allow the other Governments with which they have diplomatic relations to believe that they are uninterested in this matter. Indeed supportive action by them is essential. But history and economics have their own logic; when Tanzania protests to France, the impact is much less than if the Ivory Coast does so; similarly, strong opinion expressed to Britain by Nigeria stands more chance of leading to action than a similar protest from, say, Rwanda. But in both the above examples a registration of opinion from all African countries would be the most effective of all.

Government-to-government pressure will be appropriate to deal with failures to enforce the United Nations Mandate Sanctions by which all member nations are bound. But it is also possible for African states to take direct action against those firms and businesses which are taking part in sanctions-breaking. For when a firm is given a choice between trading with Rhodesia or trading with free African states, there will be few, if any, which make what is for Africa a wrong choice! Yet nor is such discrimination an impossible task for even the weakest of African states. There are certain countries, like Botswana, Zambia and Malawi, which would be unable to survive if they applied sanctions in their fullest rigour — though two of them make very great and expensive efforts in this direction. But every nation can afford to discriminate between the firms it deals with; there are unlikely to be many difficulties in finding people anxious to supply the goods which used to be supplied by a sanctions-breaker! It is necessary that Africa should decide to exert this kind of direct business pressure — one of the actions which are unlikely to have heavy political costs to us. For it would be difficult for other Governments to protest discrimination against their citizens if the reason for that discrimination is that these are breaking United Nations' sanctions!

What is the Aim?

The purpose of sanctions, of refusing international recognition to the Smith regime, and of other forms of pressure, is to prepare the ground for a real settlement in Rhodesia — that is, one which leads, by peaceful means or with the minimum of violence, towards independence on the basis of majority rule. The immediate objective is therefore negotiations between representatives of the African majority of Rhodesia; of the white minority which is now in power; and of either the British Government which is legally responsible for the situation in that colony, or some other body such as the United Nations. The purpose of such negotiations must be, and must be understood to be, the next steps towards majority rule. The question
of independence for Rhodesia comes only after that majority rule has been obtained.

If such negotiations as these were held tomorrow, the whites would presumably be represented by Ian Smith and his colleagues, the Africans by Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo and the Rev. Sithole, and the British Government by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. But it is not the names which are important; it is the representative character of the leaders which matters in such a Conference. Africa is not fighting for this individual or that, but for the African people of Rhodesia to have a chance to select their own leaders and to determine their own future.

Already the African National Council has suggested a Convention of representatives of different Rhodesian groups, and the British Foreign Secretary has indicated that any new initiative should come from the different races of Rhodesia acting in concert. Smith and his ruling Rhodesian Front have dismissed the ANC proposal with expressions of contempt, and are unlikely to allow any such Convention to take place without them. But an intensification of sanctions, and increasing danger from the Freedom Fighters of Southern Africa, combined with the expected growth in Rhodesia's economic difficulties, may eventually make the Rhodesian authorities more amenable to reason — though they will certainly not become willing for such talks unless pressure on them is increased.

The fact that the current ANC initiative will probably fail is thus an argument for further efforts, not an argument for an international "washing of hands". For no-one can say when and how the breakthrough will come. It may result from international economic pressure, it may come from the psychological and other effects of Fretilimo activity in the Tete Province of Mozambique, it may not occur until these things have been combined with an effective challenge from the Freedom Fighters of Rhodesia itself. But whether the period is long or short, the only hope is to work for this end. And the Africans, who — as has been said ad infinitum — are the first sufferers of sanctions because they are "at the bottom of the heap", have now stated publicly that they are prepared to pay the price necessary for winning human dignity and justice.

One other thing is also clear. From everything which has been said and done by Rhodesian Africans and by free African states in the last decade, there can be no doubt but that the vast mass of the people of this continent, including those of Rhodesia, prefer to achieve the goal of independence under majority rule by peaceful means, even when this method means some delay in attainment. But unfortunately the principle of majority rule has itself not yet been accepted by those in power in Rhodesia any more than it has in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau or South Africa. And there is a limit to everyone's patience.

Free African states, organised in the OAU, therefore cannot, and must not, cease to support the Liberation Movement of Rhodesia. Quite apart from everything else, its existence is in itself a form of pressure on the minority of that country. The Freedom Movement is, and will increasingly become, a reminder of the long-run alternative to a negotiated evolution to majority rule. And it may still turn out that violence is the only way by which Rhodesia will obtain true independence. There must be an increase in Africa's efforts in this respect, not a decrease.

Conclusion.

The prime responsibility for the future freedom of Rhodesia lies with the people of Rhodesia. But the peoples and Governments of free African states have
an inescapable duty to assist them. There are six things which African states must do as a minimum:

(a) They must themselves participate in, and actively enforce, the United Nations Mandatory Sanctions, and give maximum assistance to those neighbours of Rhodesia who have paid, and are still paying, most heavily for the sanctions policy.

(b) They must exert the maximum possible pressure to ensure that Governments of other countries enforce sanctions; and each African state should concentrate its efforts on that foreign power with which it has special links.

(c) They must discriminate against those firms and businesses which are breaking sanctions or are otherwise assisting the economy of Rhodesia, so that such organisations are forced to make a choice in their trading and other activities.

(d) They must work in the United Nations to make international enforcement procedures more effective, particularly in relation to giving publicity about sanctions-breaking, and must work for an agreement to seize without compensation goods exported from Rhodesia, even if these are travelling under false documents.

(e) They must seek to get sanctions extended into the Communications field and other areas still exempted.

(f) They must step up their support for the Liberation Movements of Southern Africa, including those of Rhodesia.

Certainly the prospects for the immediate future in Rhodesia are not good; but in the long run there is reason for optimism. For the Africans of Rhodesia are now more politically conscious than ever before and have made clear their determination and ability to endure suffering and still seize every opportunity to make their voice heard. The people of Rhodesia, under the leadership of the ANC, or whatever replaces this if the ANC is banned, deserve Africa’s support. They must receive it.

3rd June 1972.